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ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. military depends on space-based technology for communication, remote 
sensing, and position, navigation, and timing (PNT). Changing international dynamics in 
Great Power Competition, specifically the increase in antisatellite testing and 
development, threaten the space-based capabilities military forces utilize, including 
Special Operations Forces. In 2006, the Department of Defense developed the 
Operationally Responsive Space initiative which focused on decreasing the requisite time 
to place military satellites in orbit following asset loss; however, there is still no way to 
rapidly reconstitute space-based capabilities that have been compromised. As the space 
domain becomes increasingly contested, high altitude balloons (HABs) can offer a quick 
and efficient method to bridge the time gap between the loss of a space asset and its 
replacement. However, HABs require modularity to improve the time efficiency of 
payload integration. The purpose of this study is to develop a modular HAB bus, termed 
the Bento Box, designed to operate independently or integrated in a fixed-wing marsupial 
vehicle for precision recovery. The integration of three payloads into the Bento Box 
demonstrates the modularity of the structure, one of which is a software defined radio 
reconfigured as a bent-pipe communications payload to relay video transmission signals. 
The study concludes with a field test of the HAB-suspended Bento Box for beyond 
line-of-sight video relay between maneuver elements. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
   
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................2 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................3 
C. THE ARGUMENT FOR HIGH ALTITUDE BALLOONS ..................3 
1. Advantages......................................................................................4 
2. Trade-offs........................................................................................8 
D. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................11 
1. The Strategic Environment .........................................................11 
2. Designing the Bento Box ..............................................................12 
3. Validating the Bento Box.............................................................13 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................13 
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ...............................................................15 
A. ASATS OF THE COLD WAR ...............................................................15 
1. United States .................................................................................16 
2. Soviet Union ..................................................................................19 
B. CRAWLING START TO AN ASAT RACE .........................................21 
C. THE PHYSICS OF ASATS ....................................................................24 
D. THE FAILURES OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS .......................................................................................27 
E. PROTECTING CRITICAL CAPABILITIES IN AN 
ANARCHIC SYSTEM ............................................................................30 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................33 
III. DESIGNING THE BENTO BOX.......................................................................35 
A. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS ...............................................................37 
1. Modularity ....................................................................................37 
2. Structural Integrity ......................................................................39 
B. PAYLOAD INTEGRATION ..................................................................42 
1. SDR Relay Payload ......................................................................43 
2. EO Sensor Payload ......................................................................55 
3. LED Payload.................................................................................56 
C. RF MANAGEMENT ...............................................................................57 
1. Frequency Allocation ...................................................................57 
2. Antenna Placement ......................................................................58 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................60 
   
 
viii 
IV. BENTO BOX VALIDATION .............................................................................61 
A. SYSTEMS TESTS ...................................................................................61 
1. Bento Box System—Payload Commanding...............................61 
2. End-to-End System-Level Testing ..............................................66 
B. FLIGHT TEST .........................................................................................69 
1. Scenario .........................................................................................70 
2. Results ...........................................................................................74 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ....................................................................79 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................81 
A. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE WORK ..................................81 
B. FINAL THOUGHTS ...............................................................................83 
APPENDIX A. CAD DRAWINGS .................................................................................85 
APPENDIX B. SSH CONNECTION TO BUS VIA MOBAXTERM .........................93 
APPENDIX C. SDR PYTHON CODE ..........................................................................95 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................103 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................109 
 
  
   
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Angular relationships between asset, target, and Earth’s center. .................8 
Figure 2. Beta angle is the angle between the orbit plane and the solar vector. .......10 
Figure 3. Spectrum of international space governance .............................................28 
Figure 4. CONOP overview ......................................................................................36 
Figure 5. Bento Box adapter plates ...........................................................................38 
Figure 6. Payload adapter plates in Bento Box .........................................................39 
Figure 7. CONOP for a marsupial system UAV as precision recovery ....................40 
Figure 8. Accelerometer data from SNC Ronin ........................................................41 
Figure 9. Stress results with 12.25 N load on center rails—plate pinned on the 
four corners ................................................................................................42 
Figure 10. Block diagram: Bento Box with SDR drone relay, electro-optical 
sensor, and LED payload ...........................................................................43 
Figure 11. Adalm Pluto transmit power using analog loopback function ...................44 
Figure 12. SDR relay and overview of flight demonstration from March 2021 .........44 
Figure 13. Adalm Pluto SDR placement in Bento Box—RF shielding coats the 
inside of the poly lactic acid printed case ..................................................45 
Figure 14. ADPA9002 evaluation board running at 12V and 350 mA reaches 60 
degrees Celsius within one minute of operation ........................................46 
Figure 15. Placement of ADPA9002 amplifier evaluation board and ZFBT-
4R2G+ bias tee in the Bento Box ..............................................................47 
Figure 16. Placement of Mini-Circuits ZX60-83LN-S+ 5V low-noise amplifier 
in the Bento Box before the 12V amplifier evaluation board ....................48 
Figure 17. Power spectral density test for SDR relay integrated in Bento Box ..........49 
Figure 18. Spectral analysis of the Bento Box utilizing an Adalm Pluto and 
Simulink .....................................................................................................50 
   
 
x 
Figure 19. Spectral density comparison of SDR relay with and without 
amplification utilizing the Pluto spectral analyzer .....................................51 
Figure 20. EO sensor transmitter modulating on the SDR relay signal ......................52 
Figure 21. The effects of a modulating frequency on a carrier frequency ..................53 
Figure 22. Placement of EO sensor in the Bento Box—cases custom made for 
the adapter plates........................................................................................55 
Figure 23. Comparison of spectral densities of EO sensor and SDR relay .................56 
Figure 24. Placement of LED Payload into the Bento Box.........................................57 
Figure 25. Visual aid of channel frequencies ..............................................................58 
Figure 26. Antenna placement avoids multiples of the wavelength of the carrier 
frequency....................................................................................................59 
Figure 27. Aluminum shielding between the antennae and the components of 
the Bento Box ............................................................................................59 
Figure 28. LED payload confirmed after P0 OFF command ......................................63 
Figure 29. EO sensor confirmed after P1 OFF command ...........................................64 
Figure 30. System test of SDR video relay .................................................................64 
Figure 31. Power supply location and discharge profile .............................................65 
Figure 32. End-to-end systems-level test conducted on NPS campus ........................67 
Figure 33. Ground segment .........................................................................................68 
Figure 34. COSMOS GUI indication of payload response .........................................68 
Figure 35. Drone signal test with rotors spinning .......................................................69 
Figure 36. Flight demonstration geometry ..................................................................71 
Figure 37. Launch of HAB—Partner Force preparing to start patrol .........................72 
Figure 38. Drone supporting Partner Force—PF receiving video feed from 
drone and HAB EO sensor .........................................................................73 
Figure 39. Ground segment located at Monterey Bay Academy Airport ...................73 
Figure 40. Telemetry data feed received at ground segment ......................................75 
   
 
xi 
Figure 41. Payload command to change SDR relay frequencies ................................75 
Figure 42. COSMOS GUI with payload commands, telemetry data, and payload 
voltage status ..............................................................................................76 
Figure 43. Drone feed of the PF on patrol—relayed through the HAB to the 
ground segment ..........................................................................................77 
Figure 44. Overhead view of target area from EO sensor ...........................................78 
Figure 45. Plate carrier camera relayed through Bento Box .......................................78 
Figure 46. Mobile ground segment .............................................................................79 
Figure 47. Bock diagram of using a relay to give the 12V amplifier an 
independent power source (not used for this study) ..................................82 
 
  
   
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
   
 
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. List of ASAT tests conducted by the Soviet Union ...................................20 
Table 2. ASAT probability of kill and satellite probability of survival ...................26 
Table 3. Link budget for the SDR relay ...................................................................54 
Table 4. Payload commanding testing procedure—use in combination with 
Table 5 .......................................................................................................62 
Table 5. Success criteria for Bento Box payload commanding ...............................62 
Table 6. Power budget (measured) ..........................................................................66 
Table 7. Success criteria of the flight demonstration ...............................................71 
 
   
 
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
   
 
xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AI artificial intelligence 
ASAT antisatellite 
BLOS beyond line-of-sight 
C&DH command and data handling 
CAD computer aided design 
CONOP concept of operation 
COTS commercial off-the-shelf 
CSAC chip-scale atomic clock 
DA-ASAT direct-ascent antisatellite 
DC direct current 
DOD Department of Defense 
DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency 
EO electro-optical 
EPS electrical power system 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FEA finite element analysis 
FOBS fractional orbit bombardment system 
FOR field of regard 
GEO geosynchronous 
GPC Great Power Competition 
GSD ground sampling distance 
GSEAS Graduate School of Engineering and Applied Sciences 
GTO geosynchronous transfer orbit 
GUI graphical user interface 
HAB high altitude balloon 
JOC joint operations center 
LED light emitting diode 
LEO low-earth orbit 
LPD low probability of detection 
LPI low probability of intercept 
   
 
xvi 
MHV miniature home vehicle 
MIRACL Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser 
MOBS multiple orbit bombardment system 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NRO National Reconnaissance Office 
OPIR overhead persistent infrared 
ORS operationally responsive space 
PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Treaty 
PCB printed circuit board 
PF partner force 
PNT  position, navigation, and timing 
PPWT Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty 
RAA remote advise/assist 
RDS Russian Doll Satellite 
RPO rendezvous and proximity operations 
SAM surface-to-air missile 
SATCOM satellite communications 
SDR software-defined radio 
SNC Sierra Nevada Corporation 
SNR signal-to-noise ratio 
SOF special operations forces 
SSAG Space Systems Academic Group 
STP standard temperature and pressure 
TT&C tracking, telemetry, and command 
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 
USAFA United States Air Force Academy 
USSOF United States Special Operations Forces 
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base 
 
 




The U.S. military is heavily reliant on space system technologies for warfighting 
functions. Shifts in international normative behavior regarding the development and use of 
antisatellite (ASAT) weapons and the increase in orbital debris threatens the use of space 
assets in future conflicts. In addition to securing space assets, the U.S. military and special 
operations forces need to develop alternative systems that provide space-based capabilities 
in a satellite denied environment. High-altitude balloons (HABs) offer an advantage in 
dominating the high ground of the electromagnetic spectrum by operationalizing the 
stratosphere. This study examines the benefits of HABs, analyzes the threat posed by 
international ASAT development, and conducts a proof-of-concept on utilizing HABs in 
support of special operations via the Bento Box (see Figure ES-1), a modular structure 
designed for quick integration of mission specific payloads. 
 
Figure ES-1. The Bento Box—a modular HAB bus for SOF 
 
 
   
 
xviii 
A. FLIGHT DEMONSTRATION  
Three payloads with operational relevance were integrated into the Bento Box: an 
SDR analog video relay, an electro-optical (EO) sensor, and a light-emitting diode (LED) 
communications payload. The Bento Box supported a scenario involving a patrolling 
partner force of a U.S. special operations forces (USSOF) element (see Figure ES-2).  
 
Figure ES-2. Concept of operations—the Bento Box flight demonstration 
 
The SDR relayed video feeds from a drone and plate carrier-mounted camera (see 
Figure ES-3), the EO sensor provided overhead real-time video coverage of the target area, 
and the LED payload sent a simple message in morse code. The LED payload demonstrated 
the Bento Box’s capability of integrating multiple payloads and is a preliminary design of 
an alternate optical tracking capability during loss of traditional means of communications 
with on-orbit assets.  








The Bento Box performed as designed and successfully demonstrated the 
applicability of HABs in special operations. The SDR payload relayed the drone and plate 
carrier camera video feeds beyond line of sight to the joint operations center (JOC), and 
the EO sensor provided target area coverage to the partner force and the JOC. Figure ES-4 
shows captures of the EO sensor and relayed drone video feeds received at the JOC. 
 
Figure ES-4. Results of Bento Box payloads 
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International space norms are changing rapidly as great power competitors 
challenge the normative behavior established during the early years of space flight. The 
1967 Outer Space Treaty and a series of U.S.-Soviet Union negotiations starting in 1977 
established the international norm of preserving space for peaceful ventures and preventing 
antisatellite (ASAT) technology.1 Pursuant to a voluntary moratorium in 1986, the United 
States and the Soviet Union observed “contingent restraint”2  not to engage each other’s 
satellites with destructive means; other nations followed suit. However, emerging 
technologies threaten the stability of our satellite constellations as great power competitors 
have conducted questionable demonstrations of potential ASAT weapons. In 2007, China 
indirectly challenged international norms by launching a missile at one of its own satellites, 
the Fengyun-1C weather satellite, to demonstrate its ASAT capabilities.3 Likewise, in 
2018, Russia launched a “Russian Doll Satellite” with potential ASAT capabilities that 
pose a potential risk to U.S. assets.4 India followed with a successful ASAT test in 2019, 
indicating a shift in international norms regarding ASAT technology. The threat posed by 
the changing ASAT norms combined with the congestion of space and the increase in 
orbital debris caused by ASAT testing has increased the need for redundancy in the U.S. 
network of satellite capabilities as a warfighting function.  
To build redundancy, the U.S. military needs to develop alternative methods of 
providing over-the-horizon communications systems to remote users; early warning 
 
1 Samantha Potter, “Death from Below: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Current Outer Space Security 
Crisis,” Oxford Political Review, no. 1 (November 17, 2020), 
http://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2020/11/17/death-from-below-anti-satellite-weapons-and-the-current-
outer-space-security-crisis/. 
2 Joan Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 47, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhwsv. 
3 Leonard David, “China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth,” Space, 2007, 
https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html. 
4 Paul McLeary, “Space Mystery: Are Russian Doll SATS a Threat?,” Breaking Defense, August 16, 
2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/details-lacking-over-u-s-concern-about-new-russian-space-
objects/. 
   
 
2 
systems for ballistic missile defense; imaging systems for reconnaissance; and position, 
navigation, and timing (PNT) for ground forces and precision guided missiles. Recent 
advances in high-altitude balloon (HAB) technology make it a viable method for providing 
traditionally space-based capabilities; commercial entities have demonstrated the ability to 
keep 200-pound assets aloft in the stratosphere for over 300 days while maintaining 
position or traveling a designated route.5  
A. PURPOSE 
As international norms regarding ASAT development continue to trend toward a 
weapons race, Great Power Competition (GPC) further threatens the dependability of U.S. 
space-based systems in future conflict. The U.S. military utilizes orbital assets for 
communications, overhead persistent infra-red (OPIR) monitoring, reconnaissance, and 
PNT. Special operations forces (SOF) operate in small units that require support from 
conventional forces in the form of logistics, medical evacuation, and communications. 
Space-based assets provide the medium for a large portion of support coordination. 
Additionally, SOF relies on space-based assets for mission planning, situational awareness, 
and contingencies. Pawlikowski et al. note: 
Without exaggeration, the combat effects we have come to expect from our 
smaller, more mobile force structure would not be possible without space 
capabilities. The impact of GPS alone has fundamentally shifted the way 
U.S. forces locate and destroy targets, plan operations, control both material 
and war-fighting assets, synchronize effects, and guide both troops and 
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) home.6 
Great Power competitors have demonstrated the ability to target systems in orbit, and the 
international system currently lacks specific laws against the development and testing of 
ASAT weapons. As GPC increasingly threatens the readiness and availability of space-
based systems, voice- and data-relay capabilities between remote SOF units and support 
 
5 Karina Shah, “Google’s AI Can Keep Loon Balloons Flying for over 300 Days in a Row,” New 
Scientist, December 2, 2020, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2261369-googles-ai-can-keep-loon-
balloons-flying-for-over-300-days-in-a-row/. 
6 Ellen Pawlikowski, Doug Loverro, and Tom Cristler, “Space: Disruptive Challenges, New 
Opportunities, and New Strategies,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 6, no. 1 (2012): 33. 
   
 
3 
elements require redundancy and expedient capability-gap solutions. Loss or degradation 
of a SATCOM asset would prevent coordination between elements and would effectively 
isolate the SOF unit, leaving it vulnerable to attack without reinforcements, close-air-
support, or resupply of ammunition during combat operations. The purpose of this study is 
to assess the feasibility of utilizing HABs to enable special operations forces conducting 
operations in a SATCOM-denied environment. The author of this paper and the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Space Systems Academic Group (SSAG) developed a modular 
HAB bus, termed the “Bento Box,” specifically for this experiment. 
This study and the concept of the Bento Box were conducted in coordination with 
Major Chris Gallegos; his research focuses on the history of stratospheric assets, current 
military programs seeking to implement HABs for military use, and the adoption barriers 
currently preventing the use of stratospheric assets in the U.S. military. Further information 
regarding current military programs can be found in his thesis, Operationalizing the 
Stratosphere: A Warfare Design for High-Altitude Balloons. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can HABs strengthen network infrastructure to maintain communications 
links and how can the Bento Box tailor functionality of HABs to enable SOF operations?  
C. THE ARGUMENT FOR HIGH ALTITUDE BALLOONS 
The stratosphere, a layer of Earth’s atmosphere between 15 and 50 kilometers, 
remains an unutilized domain in military operations; SOF and the U.S. military, in general, 
should invest in operationalizing it to contribute to dominance of the “high ground” of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. HABs offer a stratospheric platform to host payload systems 
currently in use on fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and space-based assets. An experiment by 
Swintek at NPS demonstrated that a HAB system carrying a software-defined radio 
operating at around nine kilometers can successfully provide a bent-pipe communications 
4 
relay between elements beyond the horizon.7 Operating in the stratosphere at ~30 
kilometers, the degree of allowable separation between elements extends even further. 
HABs can provide capabilities similar to orbital assets with advantages in cost, overhead 
persistence at any latitude, ownership at the field-unit level, and improved performance of 
communications systems. However, the advantages of HABs come at the cost of smaller 
fields of regard, weight restrictions, and pointing accuracy. This study does not claim that 
HABs can replace orbital assets, rather that they can contribute to building redundancy in 
capabilities that utilize the electromagnetic spectrum to reduce the effects of adversary 
attacks on U.S. space assets or even prevent them through deterrence by denial—an 
adversary is less likely to utilize costly ASATs against orbital assets if it will not succeed 
in degrading the capability. 
1. Advantages
The cost to place a HAB in the stratosphere is much cheaper than placing an asset 
into orbit. The following comparison excludes integration and asset monitoring since both 
methods require them and will be roughly equivalent. The advanced HABs capable of 
navigation, station keeping, and carrying up to 200 pounds cost in the range of $150k to 
$200k. The non-payload weight of the HAB (navigation, balloon, gondola) is roughly 50 
pounds, leaving 150 pounds for the payload. To calculate the cost of helium required to 
suspend 200 pounds, consider the difference in density between helium and air at standard 
temperature and pressure (STP): 
1.1 
which means that 1 cubic meter of helium can suspend 1.047 kg. Next, calculate the 
required amount of helium required to suspend 200 pounds by first converting pounds to 
kilograms: 
7 Philip C. Swintek, “Critical Vulnerabilities in the Space Domain: Using Nanosatellites as an 
Alternative to Traditional Satellite Architecture” (master’s thesis, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2018), 76. 
1.2 
5 
At most, the current price of helium is $14.50 per cubic meter, which means the total cost 
for the required helium is insignificant at ~$1,300. Finally, the HAB launch only requires 
~48 man-hours ($2,400 at $50 per hour) for a total cost of less than $210k to place a 150-
pound payload in the stratosphere. 
Conversely, the cost to place a 150-pound payload into orbit is much higher. The 
average payload weight of a satellite is only 33–50% of the total spacecraft mass8—the 
total weight of a satellite with a 150-pound payload would be ~300-450 pounds. 
Calculating the cost to place the satellite in orbit is much more complicated than the HAB 
and changes based on the number of rocket stages, fuel-type, and total payload size—
SpaceX is also reducing costs with reusable boosters. Fuel calculations alone are not 
sufficient because fuel is only a small fraction of the total cost. For example, the SpaceX 
Falcon 9 rocket costs $60M to produce but only utilizes $200k in fuel.9 However, SpaceX 
provides price estimates of placing assets into a desired orbit altitude, based on weight, 
utilizing its rideshare program.10 At the time of this writing, placing a 300-lb satellite into 
low-earth orbit (LEO) would cost ~$1M when utilizing the rideshare option. Placement of 
the HAB is roughly one-fifth the price with the added benefit that it can be recovered and 
modified as technology progresses. Persistence requirements further increase satellite 
expenses because the asset needs to be placed in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), requiring 
additional propellant for the geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), and increased size, 
weight, and power (SWaP) requirements due to longer transmission distances. 
Alternatively, a satellite constellation at LEO can meet the requirement, as demonstrated 
by Swintek, but it requires 24 satellites in 6 planes to provide 4 minutes of coverage every 
8 Committee on Earth Studies et al., The Role of Small Satellites in NASA and NOAA Earth 
Observation Programs (National Academic Press, 2000), 32, https://doi.org/10.17226/9819. 
9 Loren Grush, “SpaceX Successfully Landed Its Falcon 9 Rocket after Launching It to Space,” The 
Verge, December 21, 2015, https://www.theverge.com/2015/12/21/10640306/spacex-elon-musk-rocket-
landing-success. 
10 “SpaceX Satellite Rideshare,” SpaceX, accessed May 8, 2021, rideshare.spacex.com/. 
6 
21 minutes.11 The advanced HABs provide persistence at no extra cost. The relative low 
cost and launch simplicity make HABs viable at the team or battalion level, which would 
provide ground forces exclusive assets for communications, remote sensing, and PNT. 
Another benefit of HABs is that they provide overhead persistence at high latitudes, 
making them good candidates for polar applications. Satellites providing communications 
and remote sensing coverage of the northern polar region utilize highly elliptical Molniya 
orbits at an inclination of 63.4° to increase dwell time over the area of interest; placement 
is more costly than LEO orbits because of the change in velocity (ΔV) required to increase 
the orbit apogee over the northern hemisphere. HABs are an economical option to 
supplement assets in Molniya orbits or to perform expedient mission-specific objectives at 
any location on the globe.  
The lower altitudes utilized by HABs and advances in station keeping make them 
applicable for operations requiring low probability of intercept (LPI) and low probability 
of detection (LPD) communications. First, the lower altitude reduces the transmit power 
requirements for the link budget. Based on the free-space loss equation:12 
1.3 
where d is the distance the electromagnetic wave travels and λ is the frequency of the wave, 
the transmit power requirements increase by the square of the distance between the user 
and the asset. Therefore, to maintain the same link budget margin, the transmit power 
requirements when utilizing a HAB at 30 kilometers (Txh) versus that of a geosynchronous 
satellite at 35,800 kilometers (Txg) can be calculated as follows: 
1.4 
1.5 
11 Swintek, “Critical Vulnerabilities in the Space Domain,” 24. 
12 Derived from: Leon Couch, Digital & Analog Communication Systems, 8th edition (Upper Saddle 
River, N.J: Pearson, 2012), 599. 
7 
The transmit power required to relay through a HAB is seven orders of magnitude 
lower than the requirement for a satellite at geosynchronous orbit. Even at LEO, the 
transmit power is ~70 times the requirement for HAB altitudes. The reduction in transmit 
power reduces the probability of an adversary detecting the operators transmitting the 
signal from the earth’s surface. Second, the lower altitude and steady state of the HAB—
as opposed to a satellite traveling 7.8 km/s in LEO—means that the expeditionary element 
can use antennas with a smaller half-power beam width pointed towards a designated 
azimuth and elevation angle, thereby reducing detectability while still ensuring 
communications link closure. 
The lower altitude of HABs also results in better ground sampling distance (GSD) 
for EO sensors. Considering that the equation for calculating GSD is:13 
1.6 
where 𝜆𝜆R is the wavelength of the electromagnetic wave, a is aperture diameter, and R is the 
range to the target, GSD increases proportionally with the distance between the sensor and 
the target. At 30km, a HAB-suspended camera will produce images with 0.12 times the 
GSD of a camera at 250km with the same aperture.  
Finally, HABs offer advantages in competitive strategies in terms of adversarial 
targeting costs. HABs are observable to the naked eye and countries like Russia, China, 
Iran, and North Korea have the capability to target them; however, the missiles required to 
target stratospheric objects are extremely cost prohibitive. For example, the Russian S-300 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) has a maximum altitude of 35 kilometers14 and costs $120M 
per system, which includes 48 missiles,15 equating to $2.5M per missile to target a HAB 
costing ~$200k plus payload. It follows that using a multi-balloon strategy would cause an 
13 R. C. Olsen, Remote Sensing from Air and Space, 2nd ed. (Bellingham, WA: SPIE Press, 2016), 69. 
14 Ehsan Ostadrahimi, “S-300PMU-2 Favorit: Long-Range Air Defense Missile System,” Military 
Today, accessed April 15, 2021, http://www.military-today.com/missiles/s300_pmu2.htm. 
15 “S-300,” Deagal, accessed April 15, 2021, https://www.deagel.com/Artillery%20Systems/S-
300/a000372. 
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asymmetrical financial burden on an adversary trying to disrupt a HAB network with a mix 
of real and dummy payloads.  
2. Trade-offs 
It is important to understand the trade-offs in utilizing HABs to supplement space-
based systems. While several disadvantages exist in comparison to orbital assets, they do 
not outweigh the advantages but require due consideration for concept of operation 
(CONOP) development. 
First, due to the lower operational altitude of HABs, they cannot achieve the same 
field of regard (FOR) as satellites in LEO; the access area is smaller. The FOR is calculated 
using the maximum earth-central angle (λ0 – see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Angular relationships between asset, target, and Earth’s center.16 
To calculate and compare the difference in FOR of a HAB at 30km and a satellite 
in LEO at 250km, first calculate λ0 utilizing equations from the New SMAD:17 
1.7 
 
16 Source: James R. Wertz, David F. Everett, and Jeffery J. Puschell, eds., Space Mission 
Engineering: The New SMAD, First edition (Hawthorne, CA: Microcosm Press, 2011), 173. 
17 Wertz, Everett, and Puschell, 173. 






Next, use the maximum Earth Central Angle to calculate the entire access area (FOR):18 
1.10 
1.11 
Converting the area to a radius gives the effective horizon for each asset, which equates to 
618km and 1,748km for the HAB and LEO assets, respectively. Assets in LEO orbits 
provide about eight times the coverage area as assets at stratospheric altitudes and extend 
the horizon almost three times further, which ultimately reduces the distance across which 
a single HAB could relay communications signals between users and limits the area in 
which it could collect remote sensing data or capture images. The same calculations at 
GEO altitudes results in a FOR over 181 times the area provided by the HAB or 13.5 times 
the effective horizon. The smaller FOR can be mitigated with a constellation of HABs, but 
that would also drive-up costs for operationalizing HABs. 
 Another disadvantage in utilizing HABs is the lack of solar access for photovoltaic 
power for longer durations compared to satellites. HABs rely on battery power for the 
duration of night (12 out of 24 hours on the equator during equinox), which varies based 
on latitude and time of year, then recharge with solar panels during the day. Higher latitudes 
have longer nights during winter months which can be mitigated with larger batteries to an 
extent. However, polar applications become impossible during winter months when HABs 
would not have access to sunlight for months. Conversely, satellites receive sunlight on 
every orbital pass, the length of which depends on the beta angle of the orbit. Beta angle is 
the angle between the orbit plane and the sun vector (see Figure 2). A beta angle of 0° 
results in the most time in eclipse, which would be half the orbit time for a theoretical orbit 
 
18 Wertz, Everett, and Puschell, 178. 
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on the earth’s surface (42 minutes out of an 84-minute orbit). The time in eclipse decreases 
as the orbital altitude increases. A beta angle of 90° receives constant sunlight. The key 
point is that a satellite’s time in eclipse depends on orbit parameters that are chosen based 
on mission requirements while HABs are subject to the variation of local diurnal rhythms, 
which can be irremediable. 
 
Figure 2. Beta angle is the angle between the orbit plane and the solar 
vector.19 
Time of flight and weight limitations are another trade-off in operationalizing HAB 
systems. Google’s helium balloon project, Loon, successfully demonstrated a flight lasting 
300 days,20 but there is not enough data to know the average lifetime of a HAB system. It 
is likely that solar radiation will damage the balloon materials and eventually cause failure. 
Additionally, payloads are limited to roughly 150 pounds. For comparison, the MILSTAR 
satellite weighs 10,000 pounds,21 and orbits in geosynchronous orbit with a design life of 
 
19 Source: Pedro Nogueira, “Micro-Satellite Electrical Power Subsystem Design and Test for LEO 
Mission” (master’s thesis, Beijing University, 2017), https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.29360.25603. 
20 Shah, “Google’s AI Can Keep Loon Balloons Flying for over 300 Days in a Row.” 
21 “Milstar Satellite Overview,” Spaceflight Now, April 1, 2003, 
https://www.spaceflightnow.com/titan/b35/030401milstar.html. 
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10 years— he MILSTAR constellation is 25 years old and still operational.22 HABs would 
need to operate in larger constellations to make up for their weight limitations, and their 
time restrictions limit their operational capacity to the supplemental role that this paper 
advocates.  
Finally, HAB failure while operating over enemy territory could result in the loss 
of sensitive items to an adversary. For comparison, after a satellite fails it becomes orbital 
debris that poses little risk to informational operational security (OPSEC). If a satellite 
deorbits, it will burn up upon reentry before it can be exploited. Conversely, HAB-
suspended payloads would land relatively close to where the balloon failure occurred, and 
sensitive components could survive for full exploitation if a slow leak results in a soft 
landing—in fact, an adversary could still garner useful information from the debris even if 
a complete rupture causes a hard-impact landing. Mitigation measures include self-
destruction of the sensitive items following a catastrophic event to the HAB or utilizing a 
marsupial system for precision recovery of the items.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The study approaches the research questions in three parts. The first part analyzes 
the strategic environment to determine the need for alternative network infrastructure to 
supplement space assets. The second focuses on designing the Bento Box and integrating 
payloads for operational use. The third part validates the Bento Box via payload 
commanding system-level tests and end-to-end system-level tests. 
1. The Strategic Environment 
To assess the risk to U.S. space-based assets, Chapter II of this study analyzes the 
progression of ASAT norms and weapons tests from the Cold War to today, concluding 
that the threat is increasing and the use of orbital assets is not guaranteed in future conflict. 
Orbital debris from ASAT tests, congestion from the commercialization of space, and 
 
22  Matthew Coleman-Foster, “Milstar Program Reaches 25 Year Milestone,” U.S. Strategic 
Command, February 6, 2019, https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-
View/Article/1760172/milstar-program-reaches-25-year-milestone/. 
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kinetic and directed-energy ASAT capabilities from great power competitors and other 
space-faring nations threaten the stability of the U.S. space infrastructure on which the 
military and economy have become so reliant. High altitude balloons can contribute to the 
U.S. space warfighting function with alternative means of communications, early warning 
systems, PNT, and reconnaissance. Additionally, by increasing the redundancy of the U.S. 
space-based warfighting network, HABs would help reduce any advantage an adversary 
would hope to gain by attacking satellite constellations, thereby decreasing the likelihood 
of a future attack. The premise for ASAT development by space-faring nations has changed 
from defensive to offensive behaviorism, signaled by the continuance of ASAT testing in 
the absence of orbital nuclear threats—fear of fractional and multiple orbit bombardment 
systems (FOBS and MOBS) during the Cold War initiated ASAT development. The United 
States must mitigate the increase in ASAT threats through alliance building that gives it 
access to additional space assets and launch locations, leveraging the commercialization of 
space, and developing alternative methods of providing capabilities normally provided by 
space-based assets  (i.e., HABs). 
2. Designing the Bento Box 
Chapter III focuses on the design considerations and assembly of the Bento Box 
with modular payload plates to adapt three mission specific payloads. The Bento Box 
project is designed to evaluate the feasibility of utilizing HABs for SOF operations, 
focusing on modularity of the structure and payloads that increase situational awareness in 
the field as well as coordination between elements. Additionally, the Bento Box is designed 
to be utilized as a stand-alone structure under a HAB or as an integrated part of a marsupial 
system for precision recovery. The Bento Box makes use of existing CubeSat standards 
with a rail-based skeletal structure and achieves modularity through a system of adaptive 
plates designed to accommodate any payload board less than 1U (10cm) wide. 
Additionally, the adaptive plates can be used to attach multiple rail systems end-on-end or 
side-by-side to accommodate longer payload boards or to change the form factor of the 
Bento Box to fit various marsupial systems for precision recovery. The NPS SSAG 
developed avionics, primarily consisting of electrical power system (EPS) and command 
and data handling (C&DH) boards, specifically for this project. Iterating on a previous 
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version of the SSAG HAB bus utilized by Pross (2019),23 the advantage of the new EPS 
is the multi-voltage power connectors capable of providing power at 3.3V, 5V, and 12V to 
multiple payloads. 
 
3. Validating the Bento Box 
Chapter IV outlines the flight test of the Bento Box with three payloads to 
demonstrate the applicability of HABs during SOF operations. To preserve operational 
security of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) during the demonstration, the ground 
force in this study conducts a simple patrol. The HAB-suspended Bento Box supports the 
patrolling element with three payloads onboard: a software-defined radio (SDR) for RF 
signal relay between a drone, the joint operation center, and the ground force; an LED 
communications payload for alternate HAB telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C); 
and an electro-optical (EO) sensor for overwatch of the patrol. The SDR performs as a 
bent-pipe communications system that can be remotely programmed to change transmit 
and receive frequencies. For the demonstration, the SDR switches between relaying video 
from a simulated artificial intelligence (AI) drone and video from an operator-worn body-
camera. The LED payload is simple yet demonstrates the modularity of the Bento Box 
structure and bus system.  
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
U.S. special operations forces and the military, writ large, are reliant on space assets 
for conducting modern warfare. The loss of satellite capabilities would severely threaten 
the ability of U.S.-forces to successfully find, fix, and finish targets; communicate between 
elements; and geo-locate friendly and enemy forces. High-altitude balloons offer the ability 
to provide capabilities similar to orbital assets with a variety of advantages and 
disadvantages. While a number of factors could cause a satellite-denied environment, one 
of specific concern is the international environment regarding ASAT weapons. The next 
 
23 John W. Pross, “Filling the Gap: Rocket Delivered Short-Term Expeditionary Beyond Line-of-
Sight Narrowband Communications Relay.” (master's thesis, Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School, 
2019), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/62697, 56. 
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chapter analyzes the changes in normative international behavior in the development and 
testing of ASATs and analyzes the resulting need to incorporate redundancy in the 
infrastructure of U.S. satellite capabilities. 
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II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
Recent events signal a change in the international norms concerning ASAT 
research, testing, and development. While there exist some international agreements that 
prohibit the use of specific types of ASAT weapons, they are inadequate and fail to address 
the necessary aspects of ASAT control—preventing both an arms race of ASAT weapons 
and the tests that result in orbital debris. The U.S. military and its allies are reliant on space-
based assets for reconnaissance, communications, early warning systems, and position, 
navigation, and timing. Furthermore, the commercial use of space is increasing at an 
exponential rate. Disruption to space-based technologies, therefore, would cause economic 
repercussions on a global scale; commercial space programs will continue to increase the 
economic dependence on orbiting assets of all nations, regardless of economic status. The 
need for ASAT control goes beyond the security and prerogatives of the United States; 
preventing ASAT tests and proliferation is in the best interests of the entire international 
community. ASAT technology and its use should be regulated on the same scale as 
strategic nuclear weapons, considering the magnitude of their potential effects. Previous 
tests have had devastating results; nuclear tests in space resulted in disruption of non-
targeted assets through electro-magnetic pulses and kinetic strike tests have left orbital 
debris that will continue to pollute space lanes and endanger manned and unmanned space 
flight for decades. However, ASATs are difficult to identify and their control would require 
significant cooperation between international entities. This chapter discusses a brief history 
of the ASAT programs during the Cold War, international agreements specific to ASAT 
technology, and disputed events that have negatively impacted ASAT norms. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of how to maintain space-based capabilities in the increasingly 
uncertain environment, such as with the operationally responsive space concept, 
strengthening alliances, and alternate methods of asset placement (HABs).  
A. ASATS OF THE COLD WAR 
The development of ASAT technology began as a countermeasure to the possibility 
of orbital nuclear weapons. During the Cold War period, in contrast to the development of 
   
 
16 
ASATs today, the driving factor to develop satellite-intercept technology was the perceived 
threat of death from above. The ongoing nuclear and space competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union led many to believe that weaponizing space was the next 
logical step of progression in the ideological conflict. Additionally, satellite interceptor 
technology was important during the Cold War because it utilized the same launch and 
targeting methods as those required to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 
This section provides a brief history on the progression of ASAT weapons and the lessons 
learned from the ASAT tests of the Cold War. 
1. United States 
The United States fielded and tested three variations of ASAT missiles from the 
early 1960s to 1975; the results should have sent a message to the world to avoid ASAT 
testing. Nuclear detonations in space caused indiscriminate damage to friendly satellites, 
and a kinetic strike against a spacecraft resulted in significant orbital debris. However, the 
U.S. drive toward ASAT technology originated from the fear that the Soviet Union would 
eventually use space as a domain for strategic warhead storage and delivery systems known 
as fractional and multiple orbit bombardment systems (FOBS and MOBS);24 top officials 
and intelligence experts believed that the Soviets would be capable of threatening the 
United States with space assets.25  Soviet reconnaissance systems were of little concern 
and were in fact desirable because their existence set space overflight precedence, resulting 
in international norms allowing freedom of overflight at orbital altitudes and de facto 
acceptance of Eisenhower’s Open Skies plan of 1955, minus the aircraft component.26 
When ASAT programs began in earnest in 1963, the CIA did not believe that any foreign 
 
24 Director of Central Intelligence, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Nuclear Weapons 
[Includes Table] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Intelligence Board, 1963), 17, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1679148872?pq-origsite=primo. 
25 Clayton K. S. Chun, Shooting Down a “Star”: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and 
Present-Day Copycat Killers: CADRE Paper No. 6 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University 
Press, 2012), 7. 
26 Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions, 35. 
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country’s satellites posed a major threat; however, President Kennedy disagreed and 
ordered the development of an ASAT system as soon as possible.27 
The simplest ASATs are nuclear tipped-missiles, and they are also the ones that 
result in the most collateral damage. Program 437, an Air Force nuclear ASAT program 
utilizing Thor missiles with a Mark 49 warhead, began in 1962 following the Starfish Prime 
and Fishbowl high-altitude nuclear-explosion tests, which proved overly effective and 
resulted in damage to untargeted spacecraft and terrestrial power grids.28 Chun (2012) 
noted that the Secretary of the Air Force, Eugene Zuckert, and the Secretary of Defense, 
Robert McNamara, prioritized project 437 because the United States needed an ASAT 
program with instant reaction time; early systems required three days to launch. The Air 
Force also tested non-nuclear versions of the Thor system because the Pentagon and U.S. 
officials understood that a nuclear explosion in space targeting enemy satellites would 
likely damage U.S. satellites in the process.29 The Defense Special Weapons Agency 
(DSWA) confirmed the assumption when it simulated a 50-kiloton nuclear explosion 
~200km above New Delhi,30 estimating that it would interfere with GPS and satellite 
communications for up to three hours and trap radiation in the Van Allen belts that would 
affect satellites up to 2,000 kilometers away.31 Overall, neither the conventional nor 
nuclear versions of the Thor ASAT system proved useful, either due to lack of accuracy or 
potential of collateral damage, and the program diminished until its official dismantling in 
1975. 
Since there was no consensus on which branch should own ASAT development, 
the U.S. Army concurrently developed its own ASAT capability within the Nike-Zeus 
antiballistic missile system. The Nike-Zeus B ASAT, code-named Program 505, had a 
 
27 Chun, Shooting Down a “Star,” 6. 
28 Chun, 5. 
29 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests, 2nd ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 143. 
30 Date of simulation not provided in source, but the study would have occurred between the launch of 
the first GPS satellite (1974) and the abolishment of the DSWA (1998). 
31 Chun, Shooting Down a “Star,” 68–69. 
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range of 250 miles with a 400-kiloton nuclear warhead. The Nike-Zeus showed promise 
during a demonstration in July 1962, in which it intercepted an Atlas D nose cone launched 
from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB); the program had follow-on success the next 
year against an orbiting Agena-D.32 While the system proved useful against orbiting craft, 
its radar system would be overwhelmed by any sizable attack with multiple weapons or 
decoys.33 Furthermore, Program 505 was more costly, had less throw weight than the Thor 
system, and required the development and production of new missiles. Program 437 relied 
on spare Thors already in production. Finally, the Nike-Zeus program required non-
military personnel from Bell Telephone Laboratories and the Western Electric Company 
whereas the Thor program could be conducted solely with military personnel. As a result, 
the U.S. government deactivated the Nike-Zeus B ASAT program and focused on Project 
437.34 
The United States later developed alternative methods of ASAT weapons to 
increase their viability for military use. The ASM-135 Direct Ascent ASAT (DA-ASAT) 
was a response to the Soviet Union’s successful demonstration of a conventional warhead 
interceptor35 and also a part of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.36 On 
September 13, 1985, the U.S. Air Force conducted a successful test of the ASM-135 with 
the Miniature Home Vehicle (MHV) interceptor, which targeted and destroyed the Solwind 
(P-78) satellite creating extensive orbital debris, some of which remained in orbit until 
2004.37 It is worth noting that the Solwind event was the only time the United States 
destroyed a satellite with a missile prior to the highly debated 2008 event in which the 
 
32 Chun, 8. 
33 Chun, 9. 
34 Chun, 10. 
35 Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source 
Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Secure World Foundation, 2020), 3–8. 
36 Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2012), 5. 
37 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 202. 
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United States destroyed one of its own failed satellites.38 Toward the end of the Cold War, 
the United States developed a directed-electromagnetic energy weapon called MIRACL 
(Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser) that could temporarily or permanently blind the 
sensors of an adversary’s satellite without causing orbital debris, but Congress banned 
testing of the project after indications that Soviet directed-energy ASATs did not pose a 
threat to U.S. assets.39 Ultimately, the United States turned its focus away from kinetic-
kill (explosive) ASATs after recognizing that nuclear-tipped interceptors caused 
indiscriminate damage, kinetic strikes cause orbital debris, and the cost of maintaining a 
persistent direct-ascent ASAT capability was and remains extremely high. 
2. Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union began pursuing ASAT capabilities in 1963 for the same reasons 
as the United States—defense against potential orbital weapons.40 In contrast to the United 
States, the Soviets conducted nearly two dozen ASAT tests between 1968 and 1982 with 
multiple successful intercepts of orbital craft.41 Table 1, developed by Weeden and 
Samsom (2020), lists the known Soviet intercept attempts from 1963 to 1982; note that the 
interceptors successfully conducted strikes on twelve targets, three of which required 
multiple attacks. 
 
38 Weeden and Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment, 3–9. 
39 Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, 17. 
40 Weeden and Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment, 2–3. 
41 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International 
Risks (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 97. 
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Table 1. List of ASAT tests conducted by the Soviet Union42 
 
 
The Soviet ASAT program differed from that of the United States because it 
focused on conventional warhead systems to circumvent the Outer Space Treaty, which 
banned the use of nuclear weapons in space.43 From Table 1, the Soviets utilized the Polyot 
missiles to conduct maneuvering and engine tests while the majority of the Cosmos 
interceptors utilized conventional warhead co-orbital methods, which maneuvered in orbit 
to collocate with the target satellite prior to detonating a cloud of pellets to damage nearby 
satellite components. Mowthorpe argues that the Soviet ASAT system was superior to the 
U.S. Thor system due to its “flexibility in its intercept trajectory, allowing attack from 
several directions and hence making countermeasures more difficult.”44 Additionally, 
some of the Cosmos tests did not include kinetic effects and demonstrated that the system 
 
42 Source: Weeden and Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment, 2–3. 
43 Matthew Mowthorpe, “The Soviet/Russian Antisatellite (ASAT) Programme during the Cold War 
and Beyond,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 15, no. 1 (2002): 17–28, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040208430510. 
44 Mowthorpe. 
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had multiple uses. For example, Mowthorpe notes that Cosmos 404 (interceptor) 
maneuvered to Cosmos 400 (target) and loitered briefly before de-orbiting back to earth, 
which suggests the Soviets intended to use the satellite for inspection or satellite-to-satellite 
reconnaissance missions—U.S. Project 437 also had an inspection version. The Soviet 
Union also attempted to develop directed-energy weapons (DEWs) at the Sary Shagan 
Laser-Ranging Facility in Kazakhstan. However, Mowthorpe notes that the Cosmos 
interceptors were limited to an altitude of 1,000 kilometers, posing no threat to U.S. 
communications and early-warning systems, and the directed-energy ASATs were 
hampered two-fold: they could not effectively track satellites and Earth’s atmosphere 
diffused the laser beam to the point that it had no effect at higher satellite altitudes.45 
Ultimately, the Soviet ASAT programs reached a developmental standstill that could only 
target low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites with kinetic means. 
B. CRAWLING START TO AN ASAT RACE 
Following the Cold War, the original justification for ASAT development and 
testing no longer applied; the threat of nuclear war declined and widespread compliance 
with international treaties had long since prevented the placement of nuclear weapons in 
orbit. However, the United States had demonstrated the ability to target orbital assets, and 
other countries wanted to ensure they had the same capability. Although ASAT technology 
began as a defensive measure against the possibility of nuclear weapons in space, ASAT 
testing did not conclude with a treaty against the placement of nuclear weapons in outer 
space nor with the end of the Cold War. Since the turn of the century, the United States, 
China, and India have conducted successful ASAT tests or actions resulting in orbital 
debris, and Russia has conducted questionable co-orbital satellite operations. Chun notes 
that 
[a] nation may decide to fund an ASAT for a variety of reasons. The country 
may decide to acquire an ASAT as a political bargaining chip, as a deterrent, 
as a terrorist weapon, or as an offensive or defensive weapon; for prestige; 
or as a way to equalize its lack of a viable space capability relative to another 
 
45 Mowthorpe, 21. 
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nation … the United States’ reliance upon space systems for numerous 
military force applications is a tempting target to many nations.46  
The most basic reason ASAT tests continue is that there are no official treaties to prevent 
them, and other nations, specifically the United States, China, and Russia, have already 
proven the capability. 
The post-Cold War ASAT race began in 2007 when China conducted a successful 
kinetic strike against one of its own satellites. China launched the SC-19 ASAT missile 
with a conventional warhead on a two-stage DF-21 rocket targeting the inactive Chinese 
Feng Yun 1C (FY 1C) weather satellite as a capability demonstration, resulting in roughly 
2,700 pieces of orbital debris larger than ten centimeters that will remain in orbit for at 
least 40 years based on the debris altitude of 525 miles.47 No country had conducted a 
kinetic strike against an orbiting object since the U.S. MHV strike in 1985 prior to the end 
of the Cold War. While China did not publicly release its intention to conduct the test, 
some U.S. officials were aware of the effort based on previous proximity tests in 2005 and 
2006; when asked why they did not try to prevent the test, one official stated simply, “we 
wanted to see if they could do it.”48 Weeden and Samson note that China is developing a 
wide range of capabilities including LEO/GEO direct ascent, co-orbital, directed-energy, 
electronic warfare, and Rendezvous and Proximity Operation (RPO) ASAT systems;49 the 
Defense Intelligence Agency confirmed China’s efforts on ground-based ASAT lasers in a 
report released in 2019.50 China’s recent advances and weapons development indicate that 
ASAT technology is a critical piece of China’s future war strategy, especially considering 
the associated cost of developing, testing, and operating satellite interceptors.  
 
46 Chun, Shooting Down a “Star,” 62–69. 
47 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 96. 
48 James Clay Moltz, “Space and International Security” (Class notes for NS4677: Space and 
International Security, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2021). 
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Space-capable nations can be broken into four categories: limited, rising, 
spacefaring, and space power.51 The new Chinese capability and continued drive for 
additional ASAT weapons sends a signal that states need an ASAT capability to be a space 
power nation, which has caused an international response of tests from the United States, 
Russia, and India. 
The United States conducted its own post-Cold War satellite interception in 2008, 
known as Operation Burnt Frost, to destroy a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
satellite (USA 193) that failed in orbit. The NRO satellite contained nearly 1,000 pounds 
of a highly toxic propellant called hydrazine and was deorbiting due to the inability to 
conduct orbit-management maneuvers.52 Furthermore, the U.S. government could not 
guarantee the satellite would avoid populated areas on re-entry because it had no control 
of the dead asset. The United States reportedly intercepted and destroyed the satellite to 
prevent harmful exposure to the toxic hydrazine and did so at a very low altitude to reduce 
orbital debris. However, Richard Weitz, the director of the Center for Political-Military 
Analysis, noted that “Chinese, Russian, and other analysts interpreted the interception, 
which occurred a little more than a year following the Chinese ASAT test, as a warning to 
Beijing and others that the United States retained retaliatory ASAT capabilities.”53 
Although the United Sates conducted the strike for safety reasons, the international 
community perceived the event as a potential trend toward a race for ASAT weapons.  
To keep up with recent trends, Russia and India conducted their own ASAT tests. 
In 2017, Russia launched a “space apparatus inspector” that later released two smaller 
probes that “appear to be part of a Russian program not only to check in on Russian 
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satellites, but understand what other countries are doing.”54 The inspector satellite, which 
has earned the nickname “Russian Doll Satellite” (RDS), could affect or gather information 
from another nation’s asset by conducting an RPO on it. Though not kinetic, the RDS has 
ASAT potential. Russia also continues to test weapons that utilize electromagnetic pulses 
to disrupt satellites in orbit.55 On the other hand, India’s ASAT test was kinetic. India 
conducted the test due to “[concern] about a repeat of history with it being one of the ASAT 
‘have-nots’ if there was ever a future ban on direct-ascent ASAT testing.”56 If current 
trends remain unchanged, ASAT development will continue to proliferate and threaten the 
free-use of outer space. 
C. THE PHYSICS OF ASATS 
Current international treaties are insufficient to address the negative effects of 
ASAT use because of the difficulty of orbital mechanics and the designation of space as a 
global commons. To prepare for the discussion on treaties, this section provides a general 
background of orbital mechanics and “free-space loss” to demonstrate the difficulty of 
ASAT weapons development and the issues of treaties looking to ban them. This study 
considers four types of ASAT weapons: direct ascent, co-orbital, RPO, and directed-
energy. Direct ascent ASAT weapons target a satellite from the ground or aircraft and move 
directly toward an intercept with the intended target. Co-orbital ASATs first enter an orbit 
then conduct maneuvers to intercept with the target. RPO ASATs close with a target 
satellite to exploit or damage the craft or alter is orbital parameters. Directed-energy 
weapons send high amounts of energy (like lasers) toward a spacecraft with the intent of 
temporarily blinding the spacecraft or permanently damaging imaging components (i.e., 
mirror, camera sensor). All three types require an understanding of orbital paths; they are 
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not intuitive and are made worse by the grossly inaccurate depiction of space in popular 
media. 
Contrary to science fiction movies depicting spacecraft reaching a certain distance 
above earth, leaving gravity, and becoming weightless, satellites never “escape” gravity 
and their orbits are always governed by gravity. The perpetual freefall of a spacecraft in 
orbit gives the appearance of weightlessness, but the spacecraft is moving fast enough such 
that Earth’s gravity pulls it in a continuous circle or ellipse around the planet. For example, 
we can use Equation 2.1 to calculate the velocity of a satellite in low-earth orbit (LEO) at 
300 kilometers altitude:57 
2.1 
where G is the gravitational constant (6.67x10-11 m3/kg s2), m1 is the mass of Earth 
(5.9722x1024kg), and r is the radius of the satellite from the center of the Earth (300km 
altitude plus the 6378km radius of Earth). To stay in a circular orbit at 300 kilometers, a 
spacecraft must travel at 7.73 kilometers per second, tangential to the curvature of the earth. 
The U.S. ASAT Thor system had a five-second launch window in order to achieve the 
required accuracy for orbit interception; for comparison, the Apollo moon launches had a 
four-to-five-minute margin.58 The difficulty of conducting ASAT operations cannot be 
overstated. 
Satellite interception with direct ascent or directed-energy weapons is difficult 
based on the satellite velocity alone; the laws of physics further increase the difficulty of 
co-orbital weapons. Consider two spacecraft at the same altitude, traveling the same speed, 
on the same orbit path, with one spacecraft trailing the other by three kilometers. 
Intuitively, one would think that the trailing spacecraft needs to speed up in order to 
rendezvous with the lead craft; however, doing so would place the trail vehicle in an orbit 
with the further apogee (furthest orbital distance from Earth), which would effectively 
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increase the length of time required to orbit the earth, and the trail vehicle would fall further 
behind. In this example, the chase craft would need to slow down to catch up, which 
emphasizes that satellite interception involves complex operations and is not as simple as 
it may seem. 
One important factor in the cost of ASAT operations is that it often requires more 
than one interceptor to destroy a satellite. Table 2, developed by Chun (2012), shows the 
estimated number of interceptors required to target a satellite based on the quality of the 
ASAT (columns) and the desired probability of success (rows). Note that very few 
instances result in one-for-one ASAT launch to satellite destruction. Additionally, ASAT 
launches require the same massive rockets and launch facilities as other orbital assets—
they are extremely cost prohibitive.  
Table 2. ASAT probability of kill and satellite probability of survival59 
 
 
Finally, directed-energy weapons are subject to free-space loss, which makes them 
difficult to utilize from ground-based systems. Recall the equation for free-space-loss (𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) 
of electromagnetic emitters: 
2.2 
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where λ is the wavelength of the emission and R is the radius or distance from the emitter.60 
Note that free-space-loss has quadratic growth with the distance of travel, meaning that 
weapons would require extremely powerful emitters (most likely beyond current 
technology) to affect assets at an altitude of 300 kilometers. However, orbital assets armed 
with a DEW could make passes at altitudes slightly lower than the target vehicle and be 
within a range at which it could inflict permanent damage. 
 As this section has shown, ASAT technology of various types is difficult but not 
impossible. More importantly, the complexity of the space environment and the delivery 
method of ASAT weapons make it difficult to implement and enforce restrictions on their 
development on the international stage. 
D. THE FAILURES OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
While some treaties exist, none focus on the prevention of ASAT weapons; the 
international system has relied heavily on cooperative norms,61 hoping that mutual fear of 
razing orbital lanes would prevent a space war. Pursuant to a voluntary moratorium in 
1986, the United States and the Soviet Union observed “contingent restraint”62 not to 
engage each other’s satellites with destructive means; other nations followed suit. 
However, emerging technologies threaten the stability of U.S. satellite constellations as 
great power competitors have conducted questionable demonstrations of potential ASAT 
weapons. Current treaties place the international system at the “Limited Treaties” phase on 
the Spectrum of International Space Governance (see Figure 3).63 Currently, there are no 
legal repercussions for ASAT experiments that cause orbital debris, and the only existing 
treaties focus on nuclear weapons in space and non-interference with other nations’ 
satellites. The international community needs to develop expanded treaties and a world 
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space organization to implement repercussions for ASAT tests that cause orbital debris to 
ensure space is usable in the foreseeable future. This section covers current treaties, the 
issues of some of the proposed treaties, and recommendations for better results. 
 
Figure 3. Spectrum of international space governance64 
Nuclear ASATs are the easiest to create and are the most destructive, but they are 
also the easiest to control due to already existing treaties and international watchdogs on 
nuclear weapons development. Furthermore, Article IV of the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (referred to as the Outer Space Treaty) maintains that 
“States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects 
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”65 
Currently, 111 nations are party to the treaty, including Russia and China,  and there is no 
evidence to suggest any actors are working to develop modern nuclear ASATs—although 
any ICBM or SLBM could theoretically be repurposed as an ASAT. 
For conventional warhead ASATs, the only limitation is a restriction on the 
interference of other nations’ spacecraft. Article III of the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects states that any launching state will be held 
liable if it damages another state’s property or persons in space.66 This does not prevent 
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testing because it gives states the ability to test on their own objects in orbit and does not 
account for the potential second order effects of ASAT tests; orbital debris from an 
interceptor test could damage another nation’s asset. International agreements need to 
standardize repercussions for creating orbital debris through intentional destruction of 
orbiting objects, regardless of ownership (i.e., no kinetic ASAT tests). 
In 2008, China and Russia presented the draft treaty on the Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT). The Sino-Russian treaty was unsuccessful 
because, among other reasons, the “United States [opposed it] due to its failure to limit 
China’s ground-based ASAT weapons and its lack of verification mechanism.”67 Other 
criticisms of the treaty included: insufficient definition of space weapons, exclusion of 
ground and sea-based weapons, and a lack of verification mechanisms or bans on ground 
and sea-based weapons testing.68 China and Russia presented a revised version of the 
PPWT in 2014, but according to Tronchetti and Hao, “the 2014 revision of the PPWT […] 
leaves substantially unchanged the most controversial aspects of its original 2008 
version.”69 Essentially, the PPWT only creates restrictions that would prevent the United 
States from placing planned missile defense systems in orbit by agreeing to ban weapons 
technology that no country is knowingly pursuing. On the plus side, the PPWT would 
prohibit the “threat or use of force against outer space objects of States Parties,”70 which 
would prevent ASAT testing and use during conflict. Conclusively, the draft PPWT 
attempts to include unnecessary restrictions targeting the goals of a particular actor, namely 
the United States; China and Russia should propose a treaty focusing solely on the 
prevention of the use of force in space before moving forward with the messy process of 
weapons restrictions. 
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The one comforting aspect of ASAT technology is the extreme difficulty in 
achieving satellite interception. While multiple countries have demonstrated the ability to 
conduct interception and destruction of orbiting targets, it is an expensive endeavor, 
requiring significant fuel, advanced rockets, and substantial man-hours of preparation and 
calculations. Targeting and destroying an entire constellation of assets, such as the GPS 
constellation with 24 satellites, without affecting friendly assets, would be very difficult 
and very costly. Furthermore, the orbital debris remaining after a kinetic attack at an 
altitude of ~20,000km would leave that region unusable for centuries. A rational actor 
would quickly conclude that destroying U.S. and allied satellites on a massive scale would 
have lasting harmful effects against its own interests. But what if ASAT technology falls 
in the hands of an irrational actor? A single missile, theoretically, could cause a chain 
reaction with the potential to eradicate an entire constellation and leave space (or at least 
certain regions of it) an orbital wasteland devoid of useful assets. ASAT technology must 
be monitored and regulated with the same oversight as strategic missiles. Furthermore, 
counter-ASATs need to be developed and implemented by an international organization to 
protect the space environment and ensure the domain remains a global commons. 
E. PROTECTING CRITICAL CAPABILITIES IN AN ANARCHIC SYSTEM 
Considering the lack of expanded treaties and a world space organization, it is 
important for the United States to maintain space-based capabilities as a warfighting 
function without making aggressive maneuvers that would derail progress toward treaty 
establishment. Paul Meyer claims that the U.S. goal of space dominance and its shift to 
referring to space as a “warfighting domain” is destabilizing, increases threat perception, 
and is counter-productive to PAROS (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
Treaty);71 this is misguided and misinterprets the definition of a warfighting domain. The 
fact is that space, even without orbital weapons, has been a decisive warfighting domain 
since the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 when coalition forces utilized the Global 
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Positioning System for navigation72 and the Defense Support Program warned troops of 
scud launches.73 The U.S. focus on space dominance is neither destabilizing nor a drift 
from international norms but rather a continuation of the defensive and security measures 
required to maintain critical capabilities. Additionally, China and Russia have 
demonstrated the ability to threaten U.S. space infrastructure. The United States can protect 
space capabilities without increasing aggression in three ways: the development of quick 
asset replacement, increased asset maneuverability, and deterrence through denial.  
First, the ability to replace assets quickly is tackled through the Operationally 
Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. The Department of Defense (DOD) developed the ORS 
initiative in 2006, focusing, in one aspect, on decreasing the requisite time to replace 
military satellites in orbit.74 A study at NPS concluded that the asset replacement process 
could be shortened by creating common buses for all satellites, but that it still takes roughly 
six weeks from asset delivery to launch.75 While this is a worthy endeavor, U.S. decision-
makers must consider diverse methods to achieving the end goal: maintaining 
communications, remote sensing, and geolocation capabilities after catastrophic events to 
our space assets. 
Second, space assets should be launched with extra propellant, which is admittedly 
costly, to increase their maneuverability in the event of an attack. Spacecraft require 
propellant while in orbit to maintain their orbital parameters to counter perturbations from 
the Moon, other planets, and the oblation of Earth’s surface.76 Considering the difficulty 
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and extremely specific trajectory in direct-ascent interception, extra propellant on U.S. 
assets could be used to thwart an incoming missile immediately after ASAT launch 
detection. In the case of co-orbital ASATs, maneuvers could be made in-between each 
adjustment of the chase vehicle to move ahead or behind in the orbit stepwise until the 
attack vehicle runs out of fuel. Admittedly, spacecraft would run out of fuel after multiple 
attacks, but this could be mitigated with a spacecraft refueling program. 
Finally, the United States should increase its security through deterrence by denial. 
According to Jeffrey W. Knopf, deterrence by denial is the “ability to resist and ultimately 
frustrate another actor’s efforts…while still leaving it with the costs of its efforts.”77  
Network reinforcement through alliances, commercial assets, and unconventional assets 
would frustrate hostile states’ attempts to disrupt U.S. space infrastructure. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Douglas Loverro noted in his 2017 statement to the House Armed 
Services Committee: 
The robust and burgeoning commercial space sector provides unmatched 
opportunity for the United States to augment and supplement traditional 
government-owned capabilities with U.S. commercial capabilities, with 
significant increases in resilience and mission capability, all while lowering 
overall cost … the strategic pursuit of partnerships with allied nations can 
simultaneously reduce the need for direct U.S. government investment, 
increase the complexity of the target set our adversaries must engage, 
diversify the means for us to support space missions, and create political 
hurdles for any adversary who might want to try to isolate the United 
States.78 
In summary, the United States can increase the security of its space-based infrastructure by 
making it too large for an enemy to disrupt. Furthermore, the United States can reduce the 
cost of network reinforcement by leveraging commercial space programs, building 
mutually beneficial alliances with other space-faring nations, and implementing 
unconventional methods of asset placement. 
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One unconventional method of reinforcing our space-based systems would be to 
remove the advantage of attacking United States satellites through non-standard network 
reinforcement via stratospheric assets. As previously noted, HABs have become 
operationally feasible. By operationalizing the stratosphere, the United States can reduce 
the significance of its satellite network or, more importantly, reduce the advantage a hostile 
nation would gain from its efforts to destroy U.S. orbital assets. Additionally, they can be 
utilized as a low-cost reinforcement or capability stop-gap after the loss of a spacecraft. 
The use of stratospheric assets would reduce the reliance on assets in orbit and, 
more importantly, draw attention away from them. As detailed in Chapter I, they are cheap 
to put up and expensive to shoot down. Adding HABs to the military network architecture 
would induce a financial burden to any adversary wishing to disrupt U.S. capabilities, 
thereby increasing the overall security of space and near-space systems. 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
International norms on the development and use of ASAT weapons are trending in 
a perilous direction. The proliferation of ASAT development and lack of international 
regulatory bodies threatens the stability and security of space-based networks on which the 
U.S. military and its allies have become irreversibly reliant. Adversaries increasingly 
become more capable of disrupting space-based assets, and orbital debris continues to build 
up in the global commons of the space domain. The United States should lead efforts to 
develop international space-governing bodies to ensure the free and secure use of space 
and a means of ASAT control or, at a minimum, ASAT test regulation. In the absence of 
order in the international system, the United States must reinforce its space-based 
capabilities by strengthening alliances, leveraging commercial space programs, and 
developing unconventional methods of network reinforcement. 
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III. DESIGNING THE BENTO BOX 
The previous chapters advocated the necessity to reinforce U.S. space-based 
infrastructure with alternative methods. The remainder of this study is a proof-of-concept 
experiment on enabling SOF with stratospheric systems—specifically, utilizing the Bento 
Box on a tethered HAB to reinforce network infrastructure for an operational scenario. The 
Bento Box is a modular HAB bus conceptualized by the author and MAJ Chris Gallegos 
and is designed as a payload integration system for stratospheric assets. The CONOP for 
the flight demonstration, shown in Figure 4, includes the Bento Box supporting a remote 
advise-assist (RAA) operation of a partner force (PF). The Bento Box enables the RAA by 
relaying video feeds (payload 1: drone relay) from the support drone and PF through the 
HAB back to the Joint Operations Center (JOC), providing overhead real-time video 
coverage of the target area (payload 2: EO sensor), and enabling alternative 
communications via LED (payload 3: LED comms). Additionally, the PF can access the 
video feeds via downlink from the HAB or directly from the drone, depending on proximity 
of the drone to the PF. Similar to space-based systems, the system architecture is broken 
into three mission segments: the ground segment (JOC), the “space” segment (Bento Box), 
and the user segments (drone and PF). 
  




The Bento Box EO sensor provides overhead coverage of the operational area, the SDR relays 
the drone and PF video feeds to the JOC, and the LED payload represents alternative comms.79 
Figure 4. CONOP overview 
This research builds on the avionics developed by the Space Systems Academic 
Group of the NPS Graduate School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (GSEAS), the 
command and data handling (C&DH) and electrical power system (EPS) boards, and 
capitalizes on the standard CubeSat rails designed by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory.80 The Bento Box was designed, analyzed, and fabricated by the author, 
including the adapter plates that establish the modularity of this concept, which is intended 
for use on HABs as a standalone system or integrated as the modular component of a 
precision recovery marsupial system. If used, the recovery system would remain suspended 
under the HAB and detach in the event of a catastrophic failure or attack on the balloon. 
Additionally, with space-qualified components, the Bento Box structure and its adapter 
plates can be utilized on a LEO satellite. 
 
79 The LED payload is a simple representative payload that flashes a simple morse code message; 
however, students from the Space Systems Operations curriculum developed and tested a laser 
communications payload with high data rates that could replace the representative LED payload. 
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in 28th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites, SSC14-V-9 (Logan, UT: AIAA/USU, 2014). 
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A. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The Bento Box design focuses on modularity, simplicity, operational relevancy, 
and structural integrity. Modularity for payload integration decreases the time required to 
adapt the Bento Box to changing mission requirements. Simplicity minimizes the need for 
specialized training for payload integration, and structural integrity ensures that the Bento 
Box will continue to function during the accelerations induced by HAB and marsupial 
system operations. 
1. Modularity 
The modularity of the Bento Box enables quick customization of the payloads to 
meet mission requirements. The Bento Box achieves structural modularity through adapter 
plates with various lengths and widths that allow for multiple configurations and 
accommodate payload boards of multiple sizes (see Figure 5). The adapter plates have tie-
in points every 5 millimeters with holes for m2.5 screws. During the payload integration 
process of this study, components with existing attachment points easily connected to the 
adapter plates. Some components required custom casing (see Section B); the computer 
aided design (CAD) of the custom cases was simplified due to the various tie-in points and 
various sizes of the adapter plates. When developing payload attachment points, one can 
guarantee proper placement simply by maintaining an attachment point separation in 
multiples of 10mm in the x-axis (length) and 5mm in the y-axis (width). Appendix A 
contains the CAD drawings of the base adapter plate, the smallest adapter plate, and the 
custom parts for mounting the payloads. 




Various plate sizes simplify payload integration; the plate on the far left is specifically designed 
as a base plate for the Lawrence Livermore CubeSat rails.81 
Figure 5. Bento Box adapter plates 
The plates fit within the payload compartment and stack upon each other via m2.5 
hex male-female standoffs of various heights. Figure 6 shows the two adapter plates 
separated by hex standoffs with two payloads and their components distributed over the 
plates. The length of the stand-off is chosen based on payload clearance requirements.  
 
81 Adapter Plates designed, modeled, and printed by James Hansen, 2021. 




Figure 6. Payload adapter plates in Bento Box 
2. Structural Integrity 
High altitude balloon operations induce accelerations on the structure, and the 
design must ensure survival of the bus and payloads. Precision recovery of the Bento Box 
back to friendly forces via a marsupial system induces additional accelerations. The 
concept of a marsupial system, as shown in Figure 7, is that a UAV would remain 
suspended underneath the HAB with all sensitive payloads and release in the event of HAB 
failure. Currently, there are two efforts in designing a HAB-dropped UAV that could 
perform as the marsupial system: the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) Night 
Fury project and the Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) Ronin.  




The UAV remains suspended under the HAB and releases for precision recovery in the event 
of a catastrophic incident to the balloon. 
Figure 7. CONOP for a marsupial system UAV as precision recovery 
SNC provided accelerometer data of a drop-test of the Ronin from 90,000 feet for 
analysis (see Figure 8). Considering that the max acceleration occurs during the ascent 
phase of the HAB launch, the structure needs to withstand accelerations up to 4.5 times 
Earth’s gravity (g0), regardless of whether the Bento Box is in the standalone or marsupial 
configuration.  




Note the max acceleration of ~4.5 Gs occurs during the HAB launch phase. 
Figure 8. Accelerometer data from SNC Ronin82 
Finite element analysis (FEA) in Siemens NX, a CAD modeling software package, 
confirms the structural integrity of the adapter plates.83 The finite element model in Figure 
9 focuses on one plate pinned at the four corners with a 12.25N load placed on the center 
two beams of the plate, which is equivalent to 0.6 pounds at 4.5 G’s—much heavier than 
any payloads on this experiment. The maximum stress experienced by the plate is 2.17 
megapascals (MPa), well within the 57 MPa tensile strength of 3D printable 
polycarbonate.84 Even with the most conservative factor of safety for spaceflight, the 
adapter plates are structurally adequate. 
 
82 Derived from accelerometer data provided by Sierra Nevada Corporation. 
83 “FEA / Finite Element Analysis,” Siemens Digital Industries Software, accessed May 11, 2021, 
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Figure 9. Stress results with 12.25 N load on center rails—plate pinned on 
the four corners 
B. PAYLOAD INTEGRATION 
The Bento Box incorporates payloads via modular adapter plates and multiple 
connectors from the EPS, providing a range of 3.3 to 12V of input power to the payloads. 
For the flight demonstration in this study, the Bento Box utilizes three payloads: a software-
defined radio (SDR) video relay, an electro-optical (EO) sensor, and a light-emitting diode 
(LED) communications payload that sends messages in morse code. The EPS delivers 12V 
to the EO sensor and an amplifier for the SDR relay and 5V to the LED payload and an 
additional amplifier for the SDR. Figure 10 is a block diagram of the Bento Box bus 
components and integrated payloads. 




Figure 10. Block diagram: Bento Box with SDR drone relay, electro-optical 
sensor, and LED payload85 
1. SDR Relay Payload 
Students in the 2021 NPS Space Systems Payload Design course developed and 
tested the SDR drone relay payload. The relay is comprised of an Adalm Pluto SDR, 
controlled via Python code from the C&DH, and performs as a “bent-pipe” 
communications system. The Adalm Pluto is a full duplex SDR by Analog Devices Inc. 
that supports one transmit and one receive frequency with a measured transmit power of 
2.24 mW at an occupied bandwidth of 2.29 MHz when utilizing the analog loopback 
function. Figure 11 shows the measurement and calculation for the transmit power of the 
Pluto—the occupied power is measured at -9.40 dBm, but accounting for the equipment 
attenuation, cable loss, and attenuator raises the actual value to 3.5 dBm. The SDR relay 
payload utilizes the loopback function to relay video feeds BLOS by switching frequencies 
and resending the received signal—the signal is not digitized.  
 
85 Overall design and integration of payloads created and implemented by James Hansen, 2021. 




Figure 11. Adalm Pluto transmit power using analog loopback function 
Figure 12 shows the first iteration of the SDR relay and an overview of the flight 
demonstration in March 2021. 
 
Figure 12. SDR relay and overview of flight demonstration from March 2021 
While the capability could be utilized to relay various RF signals (voice, data, etc.) 
in the 5.8 GHz range, the specific purpose of the relay is to backhaul live video feeds from 
drones utilizing artificial intelligence. The operational relevance of this payload is that it 
reinforces communications network infrastructure and aids in building situational 
awareness of a target area for decision makers. The SDR is situated on the second adapter 
plate of the Bento Box and connects to the C&DH via a USB cable as shown in Figure 13. 




Figure 13. Adalm Pluto SDR placement in Bento Box—RF shielding coats 
the inside of the poly lactic acid printed case86 
The first iteration of the drone relay in March 2021 successfully demonstrated link 
closure and usable video feed BLOS from the signal source. However, link closure 
intermittently failed due to a combination of weak signal strength and the instability in 
orientation of the HAB structure caused by the dynamics of a tethered balloon flight. The 
previous version of the SSAG boards flown for this demonstration only had the ability to 
power one 5V payload via the EPS, which limited amplifier options. With the anticipation 
for payloads that need more power, the Bento Box EPS supports payload voltage outputs 
of 3.3V, 5V, and 12V at maximum currents of 5A, 5A, and 3A, respectively. To amplify 
transmit power, the Bento Box utilizes an Analog Devices 12V ADPA9002 amplifier on 
an evaluation board in-line with a ZFBT-4R2G+ Bias Tee (shown in Figure 14) in addition 
to the 5V amplifier utilized in the March flight. The evaluation board has a maximum 
 
86 Adalm Pluto case created and printed by LT Mitchell Kempisty in the Naval Postgraduate School 
Space Systems Payload Design course of instruction. 
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operating temperature of 85 degrees Celsius87 and quickly reaches 60 degrees Celsius 
running at 12V at 5.5 GHz. 
 
Figure 14. ADPA9002 evaluation board running at 12V and 350 mA reaches 
60 degrees Celsius within one minute of operation 
The ADPA9002 evaluation board includes a heat sink to dissipate heat but requires 
additional material contact to ensure conductive heat transfer from the device. A custom 
case developed in NX and printed with polycarbonate protects the evaluation board and 
ensures additional heat dissipation. Polycarbonate is thermally stable up to 135 degrees 
Celsius,88 making it an acceptable material for housing the evaluation board. Additionally, 
NASA has approved polycarbonate for general use, and as an insulating material, on 
 
87 “ADPA9002-EVALZ User Guide UG-1637,” Analog Devices, October 2019, 
https://www.analog.com/media/en/technical-documentation/user-guides/ADPA9002-EVALZ-UG-
1637.pdf. 
88 Omnexus, “Polycarbonate (PC) Plastic: Properties, Uses, & Structure - Guide,” Omnexus, 2021, 
https://omnexus.specialchem.com/selection-guide/polycarbonate-pc-plastic. 
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spacecraft.89 Both the custom evaluation board case and standard bias tee case easily attach 
to the base adapter plate of the Bento Box, as shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Placement of ADPA9002 amplifier evaluation board and ZFBT-
4R2G+ bias tee in the Bento Box 
Next, the Mini-Circuits ZX60-83LN-S+ low-noise amplifier (LNA) utilized in the 
March demonstration further increases the transmission signal. As noted, the transmission 
power of the Adalm Pluto is only 2.24 mW. However, the combination of the evaluation 
board, bias tee, and LNA significantly increases the strength of the transmission signal to 
adequate levels for BLOS video relay (see next section). Spectral analysis of the SDR relay 
transmission before and after the series of amplifiers and bias tee confirm improved 
performance of the relay. Figure 16 shows the placement of the 5V LNA in the Bento Box. 
 
89 Jeremy T. Knipple, “Outgassing Data for Selecting Spacecraft Materials System,” National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, March 2017, https://outgassing.nasa.gov/. 




Figure 16. Placement of Mini-Circuits ZX60-83LN-S+ 5V low-noise 
amplifier in the Bento Box before the 12V amplifier evaluation board 
a. SDR Relay Spectral Analysis 
Spectral analysis reveals the benefits of the combination of amplifiers and the bias 
tee. This study utilizes two methods to conduct the spectral analysis of the RF signals 
associated with the payloads, drone, and plate carrier video transmitter. The first method 
uses a coax cable directly from the SDR relay amplification system to a microwave 
spectrum analyzer (Figure 17).  




Figure 17. Power spectral density test for SDR relay integrated in Bento Box 
The microwave analyzer indicates an occupied power of 22.71 dBm over an 
occupied bandwidth of 2.48 MHz when relaying a signal via the analog loopback function, 
which is an increase of 19.2 dB from the measured output without amplification. The 
second method of spectral analysis uses an additional Adalm Pluto connected to a computer 
running a Simulink program with the “Communications Support Package for Analog 
Devices ADALM-Pluto Radio,”90 which provides a qualitative signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 
of the received signal focused on the defined central frequency. Figure 18 shows the setup 
when utilizing the Pluto as a spectrum analyzer. 
 
90 “Spectral Analysis with ADALM-PLUTO Radio - MATLAB & Simulink Example,” MathWorks, 
accessed May 3, 2021, https://www.mathworks.com/help/supportpkg/plutoradio/ug/spectral-analysis-with-
adalm-pluto-radio.html. 




Figure 18. Spectral analysis of the Bento Box utilizing an Adalm Pluto and 
Simulink 
Again, the spectral data of the Pluto transmission without amplification provides 
data for comparing the performance of the amplification system. For both tests, the Adalm 
Pluto relayed a video feed from a video source transmitting on 5.745 GHz (channel A7) by 
retransmitting the signal on 5.945 GHz (channel E8). Figure 19 shows the results from the 
Pluto spectrum analyzer test. The spectral data indicate roughly 20 dB of gain generated 
by the series of amplifiers, which is corroborated by the previous test on the microwave 
analyzer. The assessment confirms both the quality of the amplification system and the use 
of the Adalm Pluto as a spectrum analyzer. The comparable results from both the 
microwave analyzer and the Adalm Pluto validated the viability of using a Pluto for the 
field systems tests in Chapter IV of this study.  




Left: Power spectral density of Pluto SDR at 5.945 GHz without amplification. Right: Power 
spectral density of Pluto SDR at 5.945 GHz with 5V ZX60-83LN-S+ amplifier, 12V 
ADPA9002 evaluation board, and ZFBT-4R2G+ bias tee. 
Figure 19. Spectral density comparison of SDR relay with and without 
amplification utilizing the Pluto spectral analyzer 
Further analysis of the spectral data at a wider span utilizing the microwave 
analyzer reveals the effects of combining the EO sensor and 12V amplifier evaluation 
board on the same 12V power jack. Figure 20 shows the comparison of the amplifier system 
when powered by an adjustable direct current (DC) power supply versus the EPS, which 
results in significant distortion 150 MHz both above and below the center frequency. 




Left: The spectral density of the SDR relay has one peak at a 500 MHz span when the 
amplification system is powered by an adjustable DC power supply. Right:  The spectral density 
has three peaks when the amplification system is integrated in the Bento Box and powered by 
the EPS. 
Figure 20. EO sensor transmitter modulating on the SDR relay signal 
The EO sensor frequency, originally occupying 5.865 GHz, modulates the carrier 
frequency of the SDR relay and induces a second peak on the upper side-band of the signal. 
Figure 21 shows the process of a modulating frequency on a carrier frequency.91 
 
91 Terry E. Smith, Amplitude Modulation (AM) (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 
11. 




Figure 21. The effects of a modulating frequency on a carrier frequency92 
Proper frequency allocation can help reduce the interference caused by the 
distortion, which is the method utilized in the flight test of this study due to time constraints. 
However, future use of the SDR relay should include reduction of the distortion by either 
allocating an independent power source for the amplifiers or adding a filter between power 
cables leading to the EO sensor and amplification system. The magnitude of the EO sensor 
signal and its proximity to the SDR relay center frequency may preclude filtering and an 
independent power source may result in a cleaner signal. 
b. SDR Relay Link Budget 
Utilizing the measured transmit power of the SDR relay, link budget calculations 
provide the estimated transmit distances of the SDR relay. Analog video signals require a 
20 dB SNR at the receiver to reproduce the video feed.93 First, the thermal noise power is 
required to establish the SNR at the source of the signal, which is calculated using Equation 
3.1 where PN  is the noise power, k is Boltzmann’s constant, TS  is the system temperature, 
and BN  is the occupied bandwidth:94 
 
92 Smith, Amplitude Modulation (AM). 
93 Theodore S. Rappaport, Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice, 2nd ed. (India: Pearson 
Education, 1990), 343. 
94 Couch, Digital & Analog Communication Systems, 602. 
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  3.1 
The ratio of the measured occupied power of the SDR relay signal and the thermal noise 
power yield an SNR of: 
3.2 
With a known SNR value at the source of the SDR relay, the link budget can be calculated 
to find the allowable free space loss LFS.  
Table 3. Link budget for the SDR relay 
 
 
Finally, with an allowable LFS of 126.1 dB (4.07x1012 - unitless), the operational distance 
of the SDR relay can be calculated with algebraic manipulation of the free-space-loss 





95 Couch, 599. 
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With the amplification system, the expected operational distance of the SDR relay is 
8.30km, which is an acceptable distance for relaying video feeds BLOS for this 
experiment. 
2. EO Sensor Payload 
The EO sensor provides an overhead view of the operational area from the HAB. 
Both the ground force and joint operation center can view the video feed in real-time to 
maintain situational awareness and build a common operating picture (COP) throughout 
the duration of the operation. The EO Sensor payload is comprised of an AKK Technology 
Inc. KC04 transmitter and 700TVL 120-degree lens camera. The camera and transmitter 
are placed in the Bento Box via custom mounts that double as protective casings—the 
custom mounts were easily designed given the standardized spacing of mounting points on 
the adapter plates. The camera is mounted in the Bento Box in a nadir-view position to 
capture overhead video and imagery of areas of interest, as shown in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22. Placement of EO sensor in the Bento Box—cases custom made for 
the adapter plates 
The power spectral density of the EO sensor is similar in amplitude to that of the 
SDR drone relay, which means the ground user should be able to receive video feeds from 
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both payloads at roughly the same distance away from the HAB. Figure 23 shows a 
comparison of the RF signals of the EO sensor and SDR relay. 
 
Left: Spectral density of EO sensor. Right: Spectral density of SDR relay with amplification. 
Figure 23. Comparison of spectral densities of EO sensor and SDR relay 
3. LED Payload 
The LED payload is a simple device utilized as a representative payload to 
demonstrate the ability of the Bento Box and SSAG boards to integrate multiple payloads. 
The LED payload is comprised of a Raspberry Pi Zero and a Perma-Proto Bonnet that 
initiates on boot-up to flash serial data in Morse code. The payload is based on an LED 
communications payload developed by students from the Space Systems Operations 
curriculum, in summer of 2020, to send environmental data. However, the payload for this 
study only continuously and repeatedly transmits a simple message (“Bento Box”) because 
it is not a central focus of this study—its inclusion is merely to demonstrate the Bento 
Box’s capability of integrating multiple payloads. Figure 24 shows the placement of the 
LED payload in the Bento Box and the location of the LED on the antenna plate. 




Figure 24. Placement of LED Payload into the Bento Box 
C. RF MANAGEMENT 
1. Frequency Allocation 
The scenario of the flight demonstration requires four different frequencies with 
adequate separation in the amateur 5.8 GHz frequency range to avoid interference and must 
also avoid the distortion peaks caused by the EPS system. Analysis of the 5.8 GHz 
frequency chart created by Michael Niggel96 (Figure 25) and multiple bench tests revealed 
the following allocation yielded the best results: drone video feed on E6 (5.905 GHz), on-
board EO sensor on A1 (5.865 GHz), plate carrier camera on A3 (5.825 GHz), and 
downlink from the HAB on E3 (5.665 GHz). Placing the SDR relay transmit signal on the 
lower end of the amateur frequency range prevented interference from the modulated signal 
induced by the EO sensor.  
 
96 Michael Niggel, “Video Frequency Management: Keeping Multiple Quads in the Air,” 
Propwashed, May 1, 2017, https://www.propwashed.com/video-frequency-management/. 




Figure 25. Visual aid of channel frequencies97 
2. Antenna Placement 
Considering that the Bento Box has four antennae, it is important to ensure their 
propagation will not interfere with each other. For optimal reception and transmission, 
antennae need to be spaced greater than one-quarter, and not at multiples of, the wavelength 
of the electromagnetic wave of the carrier frequency. All antennae on the Bento Box are 
greater than a full wavelength from each other and none reside at a multiple of the 
wavelength (as calculated in Equation 3.3) from another antenna, as shown in Figure 26. 
 
97 Niggel. 




Figure 26. Antenna placement avoids multiples of the wavelength of the 
carrier frequency 
Additionally, the multiple antennae have the potential to add noise to the payload 
electronics of the Bento Box. Figure 27 shows the layer of aluminum on the back of the 
antennae cover that helps to isolate the payload and bus components from the 
electromagnetic transmissions of the antennae. 
 
Figure 27. Aluminum shielding between the antennae and the components of 
the Bento Box 
   
 
60 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The modularity created by the adapter plates and multiple payload power sources 
of various voltages simplified the integration process of the three payloads. The Bento Box 
design is intended to facilitate quick and simple modifications based on mission-specific 
payload requirements. Confirmed by finite element analysis, the structural integrity of the 
adapter plates is adequate to support the forces generated by the masses of the payloads 
and expected accelerations. Spectral analysis shows that the additional amplification 
afforded by the increased power capabilities of the new EPS board improves the output 
signal of the SDR relay. Overall, the design of the Bento Box meets the desired qualities 
of modularity, simplicity, operational relevance, and structural integrity, and the integrated 
payloads meet the requirements for demonstrating network reinforcement in SOF 
operations. The next chapter captures the systems tests and flight validation of the Bento 
Box. 
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IV. BENTO BOX VALIDATION 
Once all components were integrated and tested individually, the complete 
structure passed a series of systems tests prior to the flight demonstration on May 6, 2021. 
The systems tests ensured proper function of the Bento Box, its payloads, and the system 
architecture of the ground, space, and user mission segments. Following the systems tests, 
the flight demonstration met all success criteria of the Bento Box and validated the 
operational relevance of HABs in special operations. 
A. SYSTEMS TESTS 
The series of systems tests ensured complete functionality of the Bento Box bus 
and integrated payloads prior to the flight demonstration. There were two levels of systems 
that required validation: the Bento Box design and the mission architecture. The Bento Box 
systems tests ensured that the bus and payloads properly interacted to provide power to the 
payloads on command and that the bus C&DH initiated the drone relay program, with the 
correct frequencies, as designed. The architecture-level tests ensured that the ground 
station, Bento Box, drone video feed, and PF video feed were functioning properly. 
1. Bento Box System—Payload Commanding 
Following each payload integration into the Bento Box, testing confirmed the 
payload turned on and off via C&DH command and operated as designed. The Raspberry 
Pi Zero’s Wi-Fi feature was utilized to establish a Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) connection, 
through MobaXterm client, with the C&DH to conduct the initial tests (see APPENDIX 
B). Utilizing SSH simplified the connection for testing and, more importantly, isolated the 
Bento Box from the ground segment components for troubleshooting any errors. The 
systems tests included a series of commands and expected responses from both the C&DH 
and payloads. Table 4 lists the C&DH commands and testing points during the integrated 
system-level test of the Bento Box with all three payloads and Table 5 lists the success 
criteria of the systems test. Validation required that the C&DH responded with the 
appropriate message listed in Table 4 and that the payload followed the given command as 
listed in Table 5. Note that the bus software is configured such that commands to turn on 
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the payloads are to “turn off” P0, P1, and P2, which are associated with the 5V, 12V, and 
3.3V power jacks on the EPS, respectively. Conversely, turning on P0, P1, and P2 turns 
off the payloads. P0 (5V) corresponds to the LED payload and MicroCircuit LNA, P1 
(12V) corresponds to the EO sensor and 12V amplifier evaluation board, and P2 (3.3V) is 
not utilized in this experiment. 
Table 4. Payload commanding testing procedure—use in combination with 
Table 5 
 
Table 5. Success criteria for Bento Box payload commanding 
 
 
First, the systems test began by turning on each payload power connection, 
including cycling the 3.3V power jack to confirm functionality. Figure 28 shows the LED 
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payload response after receiving power when the bus received the P0 OFF command; the 
payload automatically ran the Python code to flash “Bento Box” in Morse code, as 
designed. Additionally, the 5V LNA received power, which was confirmed via a reading 
of 5V on a multimeter. 
 
Figure 28. LED payload confirmed after P0 OFF command 
For the EO sensor test, the camera is facing a video test pattern; signal reception of 
the test pattern on a handheld 5.8 GHz receiver/monitor, as shown in Figure 29, confirmed 
operation of the EO sensor after sending the “P1 OFF” command, and a reading of 12V on 
a multimeter connected to the 12V power jack confirmed the EPS functioned as designed. 
Loss of signal and a reading of 0V at the 12V power jack following the P1 ON command 
at the end of the test confirmed that the 12V payloads can be toggled on and off. 




Figure 29. EO sensor confirmed after P1 OFF command 
Proper performance of the SDR drone relay was confirmed via all three of the 
established success criteria: correct response from C&DH, receipt of live video feed on the 
receiver/monitor at the prescribed RX channel, and spectral analysis of the waveform on 
the central frequency. Figure 30 shows the setup of the SDR relay systems test—the 
spectral data is the same as presented earlier in Figure 19. 
 
Left: Spectral analysis shows no signal reception at the center frequency of 5.945 GHz before 
the SDR program is initiated. Right: The SNR increases on the center frequency of 5.945 after 
the SDR program is initiated—Bento Box receiving plate carrier video feed on 5.825 GHz and 
transmitting on 5.945 GHz to receiver/monitor. 
Figure 30. System test of SDR video relay  
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a. Integrated Bento Box, Power Budget 
The Bento Box is powered by ten 1.6V lithium cells (AA) arranged in 2x5-battery 
slot holder cases (5S2P configuration). Ten lithium cells are required to meet the voltage 
and current requirements. The EPS requires an input voltage of 8V—five 1.6V cells in 
series generates the required 8V. Additionally, placing the battery cases in parallel 
increases the maximum current to 4A and doubles the Amp-hours of the supply. The ten 
1.6V Energizer lithium cells have an advertised capacity of 3.0 Amp-hours at 1.6V, or the 
equivalent of 4.8 Watt-hours.98 It follows that the ten lithium cells provide a total of 48 
Watt-hours. Figure 31 shows the location of the lithium cell cases in the Bento Box and 
the discharge profile of the lithium cells. Note that the battery packs are located on an 
adapter plate and the placement can be modified, if needed. 
 
Left: Location of the 10x1.5V lithium cells—the cells are arranged in 2 cases in parallel that 
each contain 5 cells in series. Right: Discharge profile of Energizer 1.5V lithium cells.99 
Figure 31. Power supply location and discharge profile 
 
98 Energizer L91 Product Datasheet, Form No. L91GL1218 (St. Louis, MO: Energizer), accessed 
May 11, 2021, https://data.energizer.com/PDFs/l91.pdf. 
99 Source: Energizer. 
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The current of each component of the Bento Box was measured individually via an 
adjustable DC power supply with current readings as it was added to the structure. Table 6 
shows the results, with a total maximum steady state power draw of 15.33 Watts with all 
payloads running. At a steady state of 15.33 Watts, the lithium cells can power the Bento 
Box for 3.1 hours. For this study, the Bento Box needed to function for a minimum of 90 
minutes to provide coverage for the PF patrol and to conduct all required in-flight tests; 
therefore, the battery packs provided 91 minutes of margin for the power requirements. 
Table 6. Power budget (measured) 
 
 
2. End-to-End System-Level Testing 
The pre-flight mission architecture testing was conducted outdoors at NPS with 
adequate separation between system components; functional tests were conducted of each 
mission segment—the ground segment, the “space” segment (Bento Box), and the user 
segments (drone and PF)—once all systems were on and connected. Figure 32 shows the 
setup for the end-to-end systems test. 




Figure 32. End-to-end systems-level test conducted on NPS campus 
The ground segment, shown in Figure 33, consisted of a laptop computer running 
COSMOS connected to a Microhard Nano n920BD-ENC radio. The Microhard radio 
transmits TT&C data; COSMOS is open-source software that provides the graphical user 
interface (GUI) for the telemetry and commands. The ground segment components easily 
integrate into a mobile system with a power bank, which allowed the ground segment to 
maneuver to further distances and would also allow movement of USSOF to support the 
PF—see Section B.2 for the Mobile Ground Segment.  




Figure 33. Ground segment 
Telemetry reception and proper payload responses confirmed the desired 
interaction between the ground station and the Bento Box; an example is shown in Figure 
34. The COSMOS GUI confirmed the correct payload response through telemetry data that 
provided the voltage of each payload, pre- and post-command. 
 
Left: Payloads off—voltage at zero for all payloads. Right: Payloads on—voltage at 5V and 
12V for the respective payloads. 
Figure 34. COSMOS GUI indication of payload response 
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The aerial asset for the experiment was a hexa-blade drone, developed by Dr. 
Giovanni Minelli of the SSAG, with a KC04 transmitter and 700TVL 120-degree lens 
camera. The drone provided defensive coverage of the target area and PF patrol via HAB 
relay. The end-to-end level functional test between the drone, HAB, and ground station 
was similar to the test conducted with the plate carrier camera, but also required verification 
of signal reception while the drone was powered on with rotors spinning to ensure there 
were no unpredicted disturbances. Spectral analysis of the drone video feed and signal 
reception, as shown in Figure 35, confirmed functionality of the system between the drone, 
HAB, and ground station. 
 
Left: Spectral analysis confirms adequate SNR of the relayed drone video feed. Right: Signal 
received via HAB relay during rotor test of the drone. 
Figure 35. Drone signal test with rotors spinning  
The final pre-flight end-to-end systems test verified appropriate function of all 
payloads when commanded by the COSMOS GUI while the Bento Box was running on 
battery power, representing a flight-like condition. The Bento Box was appraised to be 
ready for the flight demonstration on a tethered HAB. 
B. FLIGHT TEST 
The Bento Box team conducted the flight demonstration at the Monterey Bay 
Academy Airfield near Watsonville, CA, on May 6th, 2021. The purpose of the 
demonstration was to apply the Bento Box capabilities and HAB support during a 
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representative operation while simultaneously testing the payloads and, more importantly, 
the C&DH and EPS boards while operating as part of an integrated system. The results of 
the demonstration indicate value added of high-altitude balloons in SOF operations.  
1. Scenario 
The scenario at the airfield was a small-scale representation of the overall concept of 
operation presented earlier in this study. As shown in Figure 36, the HAB was tethered over 
the target area, rather than free-flying, to provide persistent coverage equivalent to what could 
be expected from an advanced HAB system with station-keeping capability. The altitude of 
the tethered balloon was limited to 500 feet due to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
regulations. Four PF role-players patrolled to the target area with support from the HAB, the 
drone, and lab support personnel located at the airfield. Both the ground segment (JOC) and 
user segment (PF) had access to the EO sensor payload and drone video feeds via the HAB. 
Additionally, the ground segment could switch the SDR relay payload between video footage 
from the drone and the PF plate carrier camera to receive ground-truth information on the PF 
status. The LED payload messages were not decoded, but the payload provided a visual 
indication of system status and demonstrated the ability of the Bento Box to support multiple 
payloads. The success criteria for this flight demonstration is outlined in Table 7. A secondary 
objective, once the stationary ground segment met the success criteria, was to gradually 
increase the distance between the ground segment and the target area to analyze the 
transmission capability of the SDR relay with the amplification system.  




Figure 36. Flight demonstration geometry 
Table 7. Success criteria of the flight demonstration 
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The scenario began after the HAB reached approximately 482 ft in altitude, with 
the PF patrolling toward the target area. The PF did not have an operational objective and 
conducted the movement strictly to demonstrate the capabilities of the Bento Box. Figure 
37 shows the HAB at altitude with a PF member, fitted with a plate carrier camera, 
preparing to start the patrol. 
 
Figure 37. Launch of HAB—Partner Force preparing to start patrol 
Throughout the PF patrol, the drone and HAB provided real-time video coverage 
of the target area to the PF (user) and the JOC (ground). The PF received the video feed 
via a receiver/monitor attached to the same plate carrier equipped with the transmitter and 
camera. Figure 38 shows the drone supporting the PF movement while the PF receives 
target updates in the form of video feeds via the plate-carrier-attached receiver/monitor.  




Figure 38. Drone supporting Partner Force—PF receiving video feed from 
drone and HAB EO sensor 
The ground segment, shown in Figure 39, was initially located 0.5 kilometers from 
the target area with the intent to increase distance once the success criteria was met. 
Although only half a kilometer away, the target area was beyond line-of-sight from the 
ground segment due to building structures, small hills, and a forested area.  
 
Figure 39. Ground segment located at Monterey Bay Academy Airport 




The Bento Box met all success criteria during the flight demonstration and 
validated the application of HABs in SOF operations by enabling a remote advise/assist 
operation of a PF. The Bento Box could be used in the same manner to enable USSOF 
during direct-action mission-sets in both land and maritime environments. The SDR relay 
showed improved performance as compared to the flight in March; with the addition of the 
12V amplifier and an omnidirectional transmit antenna on the SDR relay, the relayed drone 
video feed remained constant throughout the experiment and was not affected by 
movements of the HAB and Bento Box. Both the JOC (ground) and PF (user) successfully 
received the video feed from the EO sensor payload, and the JOC was able to switch 
between viewing the drone and the plate carrier camera by remotely reprogramming the 
SDR relay payload. The EO sensor turned on and off on command and transmitted video 
of the target area. The LED payload functioned as designed, flashing after receiving the 
“5V Payload On” command and ceasing upon the “5V Payload Off” command. 
The ground segment received telemetry data from the Bento Box throughout the 
duration of the demonstration and was able to send commands to control power to the 
payloads and change parameters of the SDR relay payload. Figure 40 shows the ground 
segment telemetry feed, Figure 41 shows SDR payload control with frequency change, and 
Figure 42 shows the COSMOS GUI with payload commands and telemetry data. 




Figure 40. Telemetry data feed received at ground segment 
 
Figure 41. Payload command to change SDR relay frequencies 




Figure 42. COSMOS GUI with payload commands, telemetry data, and 
payload voltage status 
Sample images from the video feeds are presented to provide requirements 
verification evidence and are an example of the potential Bento Box capabilities that are 
applicable in SOF and remote advise/assist operations. The video feeds are not high quality 
but are on par with what is to be expected from low-cost, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
video equipment. Military applications would require cameras with higher resolutions, but 
were not required for the purposes of this study. As shown in Figure 43, the Bento Box 
successfully relayed the video feed from the drone back to the JOC. The image of the PF 
patrol is taken from the video feed at the ground segment, received via HAB from the 
support drone. 




Figure 43. Drone feed of the PF on patrol—relayed through the HAB to the 
ground segment 
The EO sensor on the Bento Box transmitted real-time overhead video of the target 
area to the ground and user segments as designed. The PF was able to use the video feed 
to assess its position and the target area. Figure 44 is an image of the EO sensor video feed 
received at the ground segment. The combination of the relayed drone video and the EO 
sensor built a common operating picture of the target area and the PF status that improved 
the ability of the advisors at the JOC to assist the PF. Recall that the intent is to place the 
Bento Box on an advanced HAB that can maintain position for months at a time, offering 
persistent coverage of an area of interest.  




Figure 44. Overhead view of target area from EO sensor 
After reviewing the video feeds of the EO sensor and drone via SDR relay, the 
ground segment remotely changed the frequencies of the SDR relay to receive the video 
feed of the PF plate carrier camera. The received video was grainy due to interference from 
the drone transmission, as could be seen from intermittent video from the drone feed 
transposed over the plate carrier video feed in Figure 45. 
 
Left: Video from plate carrier camera relayed through the Bento Box. Right: The plate carrier 
camera feed was intermittently disrupted by drone video feed. 
Figure 45. Plate carrier camera relayed through Bento Box  
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Following confirmation of success criteria at the stationary ground segment, a 
mobile ground segment increased distance from the target area to test the transmission 
limits of the SDR relay. Figure 46 shows the mobile ground segment in the back of a utility 
vehicle. The quality of received video signal remained consistent during transit away from 
the target area; however, the mobile ground segment only increased distance to 0.6 
kilometers when the HAB experienced a malfunction and began to lose altitude, leading to 
immediate termination of the demonstration.  
 
Figure 46. Mobile ground segment 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Overall, the systems tests and final demonstration of the Bento Box was successful. 
The payload command systems test demonstrated proper function of the payloads, the EPS, 
and the C&DH, while the end-to-end systems test passed all success criteria for each 
mission segment. Although the demonstration ended early, all success criteria was met, 
and the SDR relay showed improvement in transmission distance, video quality, and 
consistency when compared to that of the March demonstration. Finally, the flight 
demonstration highlighted the operational relevance of the Bento Box and HABs, writ 
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large. The successful tethered flight indicates that the Bento Box is ready for a free-flying 
HAB demonstration. 




The U.S. military is highly dependent on space-based systems for coordination and 
security; the small element size of special operations forces (SOF) units further increases 
that dependence, especially in remote locations. The increase in antisatellite (ASAT) 
weapons testing and development in the 21st century and their potential use in future 
conflict increases the risk to U.S. orbital assets and, by extension, the United States at large. 
The increasing amount of orbital debris further compromises the safety of U.S. space 
systems. With a lack of international agreements preventing or regulating ASAT 
development, the U.S. military needs redundancy in space-based capabilities, which can 
be achieved through increasing alliances in space networks, diversifying current assets by 
utilizing commercial programs and smaller/cheaper satellites, and utilizing alternative 
methods of asset employment. HABs offer a unique, alternative solution to satellite 
infrastructure and can be used to place mission-specific payloads in the operational high 
ground to enable SOF operations for extended periods of time.  
The research for this study included the development of a modular HAB structure 
to demonstrate and improve the effectiveness of HABs in special operations. Three 
payloads successfully flew on the Bento Box with various power and data requirements, 
which attached via a set of adapter plates designed for a standard CubeSat rail interface, 
demonstrating that the Bento Box achieves modularity and simplicity of integration. Finite 
element analysis confirmed the stability of the structure, and spectral analysis confirmed 
the performance of the SDR payload. The final validation of the Bento Box for this study 
was a flight demonstration that met all success criteria and creates a foundation for further 
research on the use of the Bento Box and HABs in special operations.  
A. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE WORK 
In this study, the Bento Box demonstrated the ability to carry multiple payloads. 
The next step is to increase the performance of the Bento Box so that it can support more 
advanced payloads. For example, incorporating a chip-scale atomic clock (CSAC) would 
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increase precision timing of the system and enable investigation of this system as a viable 
asset in alternative PNT applications. 
For the SDR payload, the analog loop-back method of relaying the video feed is 
beneficial in its simplicity, but a version that digitizes the data would improve the 
performance because it would increase the link margin by filtering out noise in the on-
board demodulation process. Additionally, an SDR with the ability to run multiple RF 
inputs and outputs would increase the operational suitability of the BLOS relay payload—
it would be able to relay voice and video feeds simultaneously. The Analog Devices 
ADRV9361 is a higher-quality version of the Adalm Pluto SDR that can run four 
receive/transmit frequencies simultaneously, meaning a unit could receive three relayed 
feeds concurrently and still have a channel dedicated to voice communications. 
Further research is required to identify how to optimize the RF signals when 
multiple sources require the same voltage in the Bento Box, like those of the EO sensor 
and SDR relay amplification system. An independent power source should improve the 
signal from the SDR. The recommended configuration with an independent power source, 
which was not used for this study, is shown in Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47. Bock diagram of using a relay to give the 12V amplifier an 
independent power source (not used for this study) 
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To increase the viability of the Bento Box for operational use requires improvement 
in the power source. In this study, the Bento Box utilized single-use AA 1.6V lithium cells, 
but the asset would benefit from a rechargeable, higher-capacity battery and photovoltaic 
cells. The photovoltaic cells, combined with the rechargeable battery, would increase the 
operation time of the Bento Box. 
Gimbaled antennas on the Bento Box would increase the range of payloads like the 
EO sensor and SDR relay while also improving their viability in LPI/LPD applications. 
While gimbaled antennas would increase the SWaP of the Bento Box, the initial flight test 
could be done with a single payload to remain under the four-pound FAA restrictions 
before moving on to an advanced HAB with multiple payloads. 
Finally, the Bento Box needs to be tested in a marsupial system on an advanced 
HAB with an auto-disconnect power connector. As shown by the HAB failure during the 
flight demonstration of this study, precision recovery of sensitive and/or expensive 
payloads is an important aspect of operationalizing stratospheric assets. 
B. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The nature of the next U.S. conflict is not known, and it is a mistake to think that it 
will look anything like recent or past wars. However, the need for communication between 
maneuver, command, and supporting elements is consistent throughout history. Space 
offers the ultimate high ground in collecting and relaying information. The next conflict 
involving a peer or near-peer adversary almost guarantees that U.S. space-based assets will 
be targeted and disrupted, or even destroyed. Investment in redundancy of U.S. space-
based infrastructure is an investment in gaining and maintaining the informational 
advantage in future engagements. HABs are a relatively cheap and effective way of 
supplementing space-based systems that can mitigate the loss of assets during conflict. 
Additionally, HABs would offer a layer of protection to U.S. space infrastructure through 
deterrence by denial—from an adversary’s perspective, it does not make sense to conduct 
an expensive attack against a space-based asset when redundancy will prevent any 
disruption of the capability. USSOF may not need this capability right now, but it could 
make the difference between success and failure in the future. The U.S. military should 
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consider developing and testing HABs for military operations and establishing TTPs for 
their use, in advance, to make them capable of mitigating future space-based asset loss. 
Much like the dictum that SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur, neither can this 
capability. 
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APPENDIX A. CAD DRAWINGS 
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APPENDIX B. SSH CONNECTION TO BUS VIA MOBAXTERM 
Connecting to the bus via MobaXterm (or other similar remote terminal program) 
requires a computer with Wi-Fi connection to the bus. The Bento Box C&DH Wi-Fi is 
programmed to function as a wireless access point using the “hostapd” installation, 
meaning that other devices can connect directly to it as the host. After connecting to the 
bus via Wi-Fi, start the terminal software and connect to the IP address (192.168.4.1) via 
an SSH session. Then enter the commands in the command window as if connected directly 
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APPENDIX C. SDR PYTHON CODE 
# Pluto.py 
 





# Channel callout functions for  
# column index numbers are: 
#    0       1    2    3 
# Chan Act, Freq, FR#, CH# 
# Chan Act is the actual channel number when read out (1-32) 
# Freq is the associated frequency for the channel 
# FR# is the Frequency Range number (1-4) 
# CH# if the Channel Frequency associated with the Freq range (1-8) 
import sys 





#This line opens a log file 
with open(“log.txt,” “w”) as log: 
 
   import time 
 
   #Initialize Payload Message Values 
   epoch=round(time.time()) 
   payloadstatus=0 
   txfr=0 
   txch=0 
   txfq=0 
   rxfr=0 
   rxch=0 
   rxfq=0 
   txg=0     
   lback=0 
 
 
   try: 
                           
       if len(sys.argv)==1: 
           # Transmitter prompt 
           ch_tx=34  #Default for max spectrum spread 
           freq_out_tx         = channel [ch_tx][‘freq’] 
           freq_range_out_tx   = channel [ch_tx][‘FR’] 
           channel_freq_out_tx = channel [ch_tx][‘CH’] 
#            print(“The frequency for the Video Receiver is:  ,” 
freq_out_tx , “Hz”) 
#            print(“Use the FR button to select a Frequncy Range of:  
,” freq_range_out_tx) 
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#            print(“Use the CH button to select a Channel of:         
,” channel_freq_out_tx) 
    
           # Receiver Prompt 
           ch_rx=58 #Default for max spectrum spread 
           freq_out_rx         = channel [ch_rx][‘freq’] 
           freq_range_out_rx   = channel [ch_rx][‘FR’] 
           channel_freq_out_rx = channel [ch_rx][‘CH’] 
#            print(“The frequency for the Drone Transmitter is:  ,” 
freq_out_rx, “Hz”) 
#            print(“Use the FR button to select a Frequncy Range of:  
,” freq_range_out_rx) 
#            print(“Use the CH button to select a Channel of:         
,” channel_freq_out_rx) 
            
       elif len(sys.argv)==2: 
#            print(“Requires 2 Arguments, VidRx and DroneTx Channels”) 
           rxfq=“No Rx Arg” 
           print(f’16 {epoch:<10} {payloadstatus} {rxfr}{rxch} 
{txfr}{txch}’) 
           print(f’17 {epoch:<10} {txg} {lback} {rxfq:<10} {txfq:<10}’) 
           exit() 
            
       elif len(sys.argv)>3: 
#            print(“Requires 2 Arguments, VidRx and DroneTx Channels”) 
           rxfq=“2 many Arg” 
           print(f’16 {epoch:<10} {payloadstatus} {rxfr}{rxch} 
{txfr}{txch}’) 
           print(f’17 {epoch:<10} {txg} {lback} {rxfq:<10} {txfq:<10}’) 
           exit()     
            
       else: 
           ch_tx=int(sys.argv [1]) 
           freq_out_rx         = channel [ch_tx][‘freq’] 
           freq_range_out_rx   = channel [ch_tx][‘FR’] 
           channel_freq_out_rx = channel [ch_tx][‘CH’] 
            
#            print(“The frequency for the Drone Transmitter is:  ,” 
freq_out_rx, “Hz”) 
#            print(“Use the FR button to select a Frequncy Range of:  
,” freq_range_out_rx) 
#            print(“Use the CH button to select a Channel of:         
,” channel_freq_out_rx) 
            
           ch_rx=int(sys.argv [2]) 
           freq_out_tx         = channel [ch_rx][‘freq’] 
           freq_range_out_tx   = channel [ch_rx][‘FR’] 
           channel_freq_out_tx = channel [ch_rx][‘CH’] 
#            print(“The frequency for the Video Receiver is:  ,” 
freq_out_tx , “Hz”) 
#            print(“Use the FR button to select a Frequncy Range of:  
,” freq_range_out_tx) 
#            print(“Use the CH button to select a Channel of:         
,” channel_freq_out_tx) 
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       #The following is a workaround to utilize the libiio library 
       #that only installs on $python and not $python3 libraries. 
       #iio is required to import adi which defines the radio. 
       #Must have preinstalled libiio and pylibiio prior to executing. 
 
       try: 
           import iio 
       except: 
           # By default the iio python bindings are not in path 
           sys.path.append(‘/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/’) 
           import iio 
 
       import adi 
 
       # Create radio 
       #sdr = adi.ad9361(uri=“ip:analog”) 
       sdr = adi.Pluto()   #Only works in Thonny; Not from Command 
Prompt 
       #sdr = adi.FMComms5(uri=“ip:192.168.2.1”)        #”usb:1.4.5”) 
#ip:192.168.2.1”) IP not working on monitor hub 
 
       # Configure properties 
       sdr.rx_lo = freq_out_rx  
       time.sleep(1) 
       sdr.tx_lo = freq_out_tx  
       sdr.rx_rf_bandwidth =18000000  #56MHz max 
       sdr.tx_rf_bandwidth =18000000   
       sdr.tx_cyclic_buffer = True 
       sdr.tx_hardwaregain_chan0 = 0 # attenuation applied to transmit 
path 
       sdr.gain_control_mode_chan0 = “slow_attack” 
       sdr.loopback=2 #0=Disabled,1=Digital,2=RF 
       sdr.sample_rate=61440000 #max 
 
       # Read properties 
#        print(““) 
#        print(“Relay Properties Running on SDR”) 
#        print(““) 
#        print(“SDR Tx Freq (Hz): %s” % (sdr.tx_lo)) 
#        print(“SDR Tx BW (Hz): %s” % (sdr.tx_rf_bandwidth)) 
#        #print(“Tx HW Gain (dB):,” sdr._ctrl.attrs 
[“out_voltage0_rssi”].value) 
#        #print(“Tx HW Gain (dB): %s” % (sdr.tx_hardwaregain_ch0)) 
#        print(““) 
#        print(“SDR Rx Freq (Hz): %s” % (sdr.rx_lo)) 
#        print(“SDR Rx BW (Hz): %s” % (sdr.rx_rf_bandwidth)) 
#        #print(“Rx HW Gain (dB): %s” % (sdr.rx_hardwaregain_ch0)) 
#        print(““) 
#        print(“Sample Rate: %s” %(sdr.sample_rate)) 
 
       if abs(freq_out_tx/sdr.tx_lo-1)<1e-9:  
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#            print(““) 
#            print(“SDR Tx Config Sat”) 
           tx=1 
       else: 
#            print(““) 
#            print(“SDR Tx Config Failed”) 
           tx=0 
            
       if abs(freq_out_rx/sdr.rx_lo-1)<1e-9: 
#            print(“SDR Rx Config Sat”) 
           rx=2 
       else: 
#            print(“SDR Rx Config Failed”) 
           rx=0 
            
#        if tx+rx==3: 
#            print(““) 
#            print(“Configuration Has Been Verified!”) 
#            print(““) 
#            print(“Your Pluto SDR is now a Bent Pipe Relay”) 
#        else: 
#            print(““) 
#            print(“System Configuration Is NOT Set. Retry 
Configuration”) 
        
        
       payloadstatus=tx+rx 
       txfr=freq_range_out_rx 
       txch=channel_freq_out_rx #ch_rx 
       txfq=sdr.rx_lo 
       rxfr=freq_range_out_tx 
       rxch=channel_freq_out_tx #ch_rx 
       rxfq=sdr.tx_lo 
       txg=sdr.tx_hardwaregain_chan0     
       lback=sdr.loopback 
       
       print(f’16 {epoch:<10} {payloadstatus} {txfr}{txch} 
{rxfr}{rxch}’) 
       print(f’17 {epoch:<10} {txg} {lback} {txfq:<10} {rxfq:<10}’) 
        
   except Exception: 
       traceback.print_exc(file=log) 
#        print(““) 
#        print(“Execution Failed, See log.txt”) 
       print(f’16 {epoch:<10} {payloadstatus} {txfr}{txch} 
{rxfr}{rxch}’) 
       print(f’17 {epoch:<10} {txg} {lback} {txfq:<10} {rxfq:<10}’) 
 












channel =  {11: {‘freq’: 5865000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 1}, 
          12: {‘freq’: 5845000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 2}, 
          13: {‘freq’: 5825000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 3}, 
          14: {‘freq’: 5805000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 4}, 
          15: {‘freq’: 5785000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 5}, 
          16: {‘freq’: 5765000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 6}, 
          17: {‘freq’: 5745000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 7}, 
          18: {‘freq’: 5725000000, ‘FR’: 1, ‘CH’: 8}, 
          21: {‘freq’: 5733000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 1}, 
          22: {‘freq’: 5752000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 2}, 
          23: {‘freq’: 5771000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 3}, 
          24: {‘freq’: 5790000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 4}, 
          25: {‘freq’: 5809000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 5}, 
          26: {‘freq’: 5828000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 6}, 
          27: {‘freq’: 5847000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 7}, 
          28: {‘freq’: 5866000000, ‘FR’: 2, ‘CH’: 8}, 
          31: {‘freq’: 5707000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 1}, 
          32: {‘freq’: 5685000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 2}, 
          33: {‘freq’: 5665000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 3}, 
          34: {‘freq’: 5645000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 4}, 
          35: {‘freq’: 5885000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 5}, 
          36: {‘freq’: 5905000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 6}, 
          37: {‘freq’: 5925000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 7}, 
          38: {‘freq’: 5945000000, ‘FR’: 3, ‘CH’: 8}, 
          41: {‘freq’: 5740000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 1}, 
          42: {‘freq’: 5760000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 2}, 
          43: {‘freq’: 5780000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 3}, 
          44: {‘freq’: 5800000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 4}, 
          45: {‘freq’: 5820000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 5}, 
          46: {‘freq’: 5840000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 6}, 
          47: {‘freq’: 5860000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 7}, 
          48: {‘freq’: 5880000000, ‘FR’: 4, ‘CH’: 8}, 
          51: {‘freq’: 5658000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 1}, 
          52: {‘freq’: 5695000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 2}, 
          53: {‘freq’: 5732000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 3}, 
          54: {‘freq’: 5769000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 4}, 
          55: {‘freq’: 5806000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 5}, 
          56: {‘freq’: 5843000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 6}, 
          57: {‘freq’: 5880000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 7}, 
          58: {‘freq’: 5917000000, ‘FR’: 5, ‘CH’: 8}, 
          59: {‘freq’: 467637500, ‘FR’: ‘Walkie Talkie Rx’, ‘CH’: 11}, 
          60: {‘freq’: 462562500, ‘FR’: ‘Walkie Talkie Tx’, ‘CH’: 1}} 
 



















#This line opens a log file 
with open(“statlog.txt,” “w”) as log: 
 
   import time 
 
   #Initialize Payload Message Values 
   epoch=round(time.time()) 
   txfq=0 
   rxfq=0 
   txg=0     
   lback=0 
 
   try: 
 




       #The following is a workaround to utilize the libiio library 
       #that only installs on $python and not $python3 libraries. 
       #iio is required to import adi which defines the radio. 
       #Must have preinstalled libiio and pylibiio prior to executing. 
 
       try: 
           import iio 
       except: 
           # By default the iio python bindings are not in path 
           sys.path.append(‘/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/’) 
           import iio 
 
       import adi 
 
       # Create radio 
       #sdr = adi.ad9361(uri=“ip:analog”) 
       sdr = adi.Pluto()   #Only works in Thonny; Not from Command 
Prompt 
        
       txfq=sdr.rx_lo 
       rxfq=sdr.tx_lo 
       txg=sdr.tx_hardwaregain_chan0     
       lback=sdr.loopback 
   
       print(f’17 {epoch:<10} {txg} {lback} {txfq:<10} {rxfq:<10}’) 
        
   except Exception: 
       traceback.print_exc(file=log) 
#        print(““) 
#        print(“Execution Failed, See statlog.txt”) 
       print(f’17 {epoch:<10} {txg} {lback} {txfq:<10} {rxfq:<10}’) 




# END SCRIPT # 
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